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THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 



THE BATTLE OP SHILOH 

[Iowa has special interest in the battle of Shiloh for several reasons. It 
bad more men in the battle, in proportion to population, than any other State. 
The Iowa regiments engaged (all infantry) were: Second, Third, Sixth, 
Seventh, Eighth, Eleventh, Twelfth, Thirteenth, Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and 
Sixteenth — eleven in all. Besides these, there were three companies from 
Iowa (F, I, K) in the Twenty-fifth Missouri, which was the regiment that 
furnished the reconnoiteriug party sent out on Sunday morning, April 6th. 

The Sixth Iowa Regiment claims the distinction of being the first regiment 
to disembark at Pittsburg Landing, and the Eighth claims the distinction of 
being the last regiment to retire from the line in the Hornets' Nest. Five 
Iowa regiments were in the Hornets' Nest and three of the number (Eighth, 
Twelfth, and Fourteenth) were captured. All of the other Iowa regiments 
were in the thick of the fight on Sunday, and each maintained the honor of 
the State. 

Before the close of the war there were many promotions of both officerg 
and men from among those engaged at Shiloh, and several attained civil dis- 
tinction during and after the war. Major Wm. M. Stone (Third Regiment) 
and Lieutenant Buren R. Sherman (Thirteenth Regiment) served the State as 
Governors. Sherman served as Auditor of State three terms before becoming 
Governor. Major W. W. Belknap (Fifteenth Regiment) became Secretary 
of War, and Lieutenant David B. Henderson (Twelfth Regiment), after long 
service in the lower house of Congress, became Speaker. Many others en- 
gaged in the battle from Iowa served the State in the General Assembly, in 
Congress, and in other official stations of responsibility.- — Editor.] 

No apology is offered for the appearance of another 
paper on the Battle of Shiloh, for the reason that the last 
word to be said on the subject has not been said, and indeed 
will not have been said until the last serious misrepresenta- 
tion, made through ignorance, prejudice, malice, or for any- 
other reason, has been corrected. It is not in the thought of 
the writer that he will be able to contribute additional facts 
to the literature of the subject; but it is hoped that the facts 
may be so grouped and illustrated as to leave a clearer pic- 
ture of the battle in the mind of the reader. 

As far as the writer knows the movements of the battle 
on Sunday, April 6, 1862, have not heretofore been illus- 



4 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 

trated except by means of one general map, showing pro- 
gressive movements of the battle lines throughout the day. 
Such a map can be little better than a puzzle-picture to the 
general reader. 

The original map from which the tracings were made to 
illustrate the Battle of Shiloh was prepared under direction 
of the Shiloh National Military Park Commission, to ac- 
company its account of the battle, entitled The Battle of 
Shiloh and the Organizations Engaged, compiled from of- 
ficial records by Major D. W. Reed, Historian and Secre- 
tary of the Commission. To insure accuracy in the original 
map, the field was carefully platted by the Commission's 
engineer, Mr. Atwell Thompson, and the camps and battle 
lines were located by Major D. W. Reed, after an exhaust- 
ive study of official documents, aided by the recollections of 
scores of officers and men engaged in the battle on the 
respective sides. The reader must remember, however, that 
the lines were never for a moment stationary, so that it 
would be a physical impossibility to represent them cor- 
rectly at short intervals of time. The analysis here given 
of the general map jDublished by the Commission, it is be- 
lieved, will aid materially in understanding the battle. 

Though not offering an apology for this paper, the writer 
is disposed to justify its appearance somewhat by referring 
briefly by way of introduction, to a few illustrative errors 
and misrepresentations sought to be corrected, pointing out 
some of the so-called histories and memoirs where they are 
to be found. Of course it is not to be presumed that these 
errors and misrepresentations were intentional : they are 
due mainly to two causes — to the "smart" newspaper cor- 
respondent, whose main object was sensation; and to the 
unreliable historian whose main weakness was indolence in 
searching for facts. Prejudice may in a few cases have 
contributed to the pollution of the historic stream. 



THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 5 

Special acknowledgements are due from the writer to 
Major D. "W. Reed, Secretary and Historian of the Shiloh 
National Military Park Commission, for valuable sugges- 
tions in the preparation of this paper. The writer is also 
under obligations to Lieutenant Wm. J. Halm of Omaha, 
Nebraska, a member of the Twenty-fifth Missouri, who was 
of the Major Powell reconnoitering party, sent out by Colo- 
nel Peabody on Sunday morning, April 6th; and also to 
T. W. Holman of Rutledge, Missouri, who was a member of 
the Twenty-first Missouri Infantry and was with the regi- 
ment when it went out to reenforce the reconnoitering party 
and the pickets. 

INTRODUCTION 

One of the worst as it was one of the first of the 
sensational stories of the Battle of Shiloh put in historic 
form was the account by Horace Greeley in his American 
Conflict. The camp at Pittsburg Landing before the bat- 
tle is likened to a Methodist campmeeting, and the Union 
army on Sunday morning is represented as a "bewildered, 
half -dressed, .... helpless, coatless, musketless mob", upon 
which the enemy sprang "with the bayonet". This account 
has Prentiss's division "routed before it had time to form 
a line of battle;" and Sherman's division is "out of the 
fight by 8 o'clock".' 

J. S. C. Abbott in his story of the Battle of Shiloh as 
given in his two-volume History of the Civil War, gathered 
his material from the same sensational sources and he used 
it in the same sensational way as did Mr. Greeley. 

A more pretentious work, which appeared much later, was 
Scribners' History of the United States in five volumes. 
This work appeared after original sources of information 
had become easily accessible; and yet in its account of the 

> Greeley's The American Conflict, Vol. II, pp. 58-61. 



6 THE BATTLE OP SHILOH 

Battle of Shiloh it is the sinner of sinners for untruthful- 
ness. It is no exaggeration to say of the Scribners' account 
of the battle what General Beauregard is credited with hav- 
ing said of General Halleck's report to the Secretary of 
War at Washington as to the condition of the Confederate 
army after the evacuation of Corinth — "it contains more 
lies than lines". 

Another of the sensational type, though of pretentious 
title, is Headley's History of the Rebellion. Headley repre- 
sents the Union officers as still in bed, when the "inunda- 
tion" came, and says that "the troops seizing their muskets 
as they could, fled like a herd of sheep". Unfortunately 
for the reputation of Mr. Headley as a historian, the facts 
are all against him — he allowed himself to be misled by the 
fiction-writers. 

John Codman Ropes, who enjoys something of a repu- 
tation as a critical writer, in his recent Story of the Civil 
War, published by the Massachusetts Historical Society, 
shows plainly that he followed very closely the account as 
given by General Buell, in his Shiloh Reviewed; and he 
shows, also, a prejudiced judgment against Grant and in 
favor of Buell — whom he evidently admired. Mr. Eopes 
makes it appear that none of the divisions near the Landing 
were in line until after Sherman and Prentiss had fallen 
back from their first lines, about ten a. m. He leaves it to 
be inferred also that Buell had an entire division on the 
west side of the river and in the fight on Sunday night ; and 
he figures that not more than five thousand of Grant's five 
divisions, which were engaged in the battle on Sunday, were 
in line at the close of the day. 

John Fiske is another writer on Civil War subjects, and 
in his Mississippi Valley in the Civil War he describes the 
Battle of Shiloh, but not without some rather serious errors. 
For instance he attributes the "wait-for-Buell" policy to 



THE BATTLE OP SHILOH 7 

Grant — it was due to his superior, General Halleck. He 
says that General McClernand was the ranking officer at 
I'ittsburg Landing in General Grant's absence, which is not 
correct — General Sherman was the ranking officer. He 
makes no mention of the reconnoitering party that went out 
from Prentiss's division before daylight on Sunday morn- 
ing, but says that "when the Confederates attacked in full 
force on Sunday morning, the Federals were in camp and 
not in line of battle." On the same page, however, he gives 
himself a flat contradiction by telling how Prentiss had 
formed line and advanced a quarter of a mile, where he 
received "the mighty rush of the Confederates" — and the 
time he fixes at about half past five o'clock, which is an 
error of fully two hours. 

On one page he gives the strength of the Confederate 
army as 36,000, exclusive of cavalry, and on another page 
his "reckoning" is 30,000 on the same basis. He criticises 
General Johnston for giving so much attention to the 
divisions of Prentiss and Sherman, at the opening of the 
battle, when he should have massed heavily against Stuart, 
the extreme left of the Union line, forgetting, if he ever 
knew, that Prentiss and Sherman must be forced back be- 
fore Stuart could be attacked. The plan suggested by Fiske 
would have exposed the Confederate flank to the two divi- 
sions of Prentiss and Sherman, which would have been a 
blunder. The corps organization of the Confederate army 
appears, by inference, to have been well maintained ; where- 
as they began to commingle at the beginning of the battle, 
and the corps were practically broken up by ten o'clock. 

Mr. Fiske is again in error in leaving the inference that 
an entire brigade of Nelson's division was in at the close of 
the fight on Sunday night. And still another error is the 
statement that three Confederate brigades participated in 
the last attack near the Landing. He gives the number of 



8 THE BATTLE OP SHILOH 

guns in Grant's last line far below the facts, and then specu- 
lates upon what might have been if General Beauregard 
could have "put 6000 to 8000 fresh reserves into the fight 
against his weary antagonist", apparently never thinking 
of the converse of the speculation. Mr. Fiske appears to 
be particularly unfortunate in the handling of statistics. 
He makes it appear that Lew. Wallace brought 7000 men 
to Grant's right, and Nelson about the same number to his 
left, on Sunday night — an error of 4000 or more. If Mr. 
Fiske had trusted less to Shiloh Reviewed and more to of- 
ficial records, he would have made fewer mistakes. 

Henry Villard, who was a newspaper correspondent with 
Buell's army, has written what he calls "Memoirs", and 
"in order to impart greater accuracy and perhaps some 
novelty", to his "sketch" of the Battle of Shiloh, he goes 
to Confederate reports for his information. His "sketch" 
abounds in errors, even to the misquoting of one of Gen- 
eral Grant's dispatches, thus changing a negative to an 
affirmative statement. 

As recently as 1895 a Brevet Brigadier General, U. S. V., 
Henry M. Cist, in his Army of the Cumberland, quotes ap- 
provingly from Comte de Paris 's History of the Civil War 
as follows: "At the sight of the enemy's batteries advanc- 
ing in good order, the soldiers that have been grouped 
together in haste, to give an air of support to Webster's 
batteries, became frightened, and scattered. It is about to 
be carried, when a new body of troops deploying in the rear 
of the guns .... received the Confederates with a fire that 
drives them back in disorder." - Mr. Cist quotes also from 
Whitelaw Reid's Ohio in the War as follows : "He [Buell] 
came into the action when, without him, all was lost. He 
redeemed the fortunes of the field, and justly won the title 

2 Cist's The Army of the Cumberland, pp. 74, 75. 



THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 9 

of the "Hero of Pittsburg Landing ".^ Of the second quota- 
tion it needs only to be said that its author was the news- 
paper correspondent who wrote the first sensational and 
untruthful account of the Battle of Shiloh. The other 
quotation may well pass for an Arabian Nights tale. 

General Lew. Wallace, commanding the second division 
of Grant's army, having his camp at Crump's Landing six 
miles down the river from Pittsburg Landing, has left for 
us his Autobiography, which in many respects is an inter- 
esting work. But if it is to bo judged by its account of the 
Battle of Shiloh, in which Wallace participated on the sec- 
ond day, the author's reputation as a writer of fiction will 
not suffer. General AVallace accepts the first stories as to 
the "complete surprise" of the camp and offers argument 
to prove the contention. Then he proceeds to upset his own 
argument by showing that Prentiss and Sherman had their 
divisions in line of battle before six o'clock, or before the 
Confederate lines began to move to the attack. He brings 
the advance of Buell's army on the field some three hours 
before it was actually there; has General W. H. L. AVallace 
mortally wounded about the same length of time before the 
incident occurred; has General Johnston killed in front of 
the Hornets' Nest. He credits the men in the Hornets' 
Nest with holding the position "for two or three hours", 
whereas it was "held" from about 9:30 a. m. to about 5:30 
p. m. "against the choicest chivalry of the South, led by 
General Johnston himself", to quote General Wallace. In 
fact, General Johnston led no assault upon the Hornets' 
Nest, or upon any other position in the Union line. These 
are a few of many fictions in Wallace's Autobiography, 
where, of all places, the truth should be found. 

Had it been true that the position at the Hornets' Nest 

• Cist's The Army of the Cumberland, p. 77. 



10 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 

was held "for two or three hours" only, Grant's center 
would have been broken while Nelson's division was still 
ten miles away, and about the hour when Wallace's divi- 
sion started on its fifteen mile march. In that event, the 
story of the Battle of Shiloh would have been a different 
story. Grant's army would, probably, have been defeated, 
and Buell's army then strung out over thirty miles of coun- 
try road, might easily have suffered the same fate. For- 
tunately, General Wallace was writing fiction. 

At the risk of tediousness one more writer on the Battle 
of Shiloh will be mentioned. General Buell, who partici- 
pated in the battle of the second day, in a carefully pre- 
pared paper, entitled Shiloh Revieiced* takes the position 
of an advocate before a court and jury, stating what he 
expects to prove, then marshalling his facts — or fictions, 
as the case may be — to make good his contention. He 
opens his ease with the following proposition: "At the 
moment near the close of the day when the remnant of the 
retrograding army was driven to refuge in the midst 
of its magazines, with the triumphant enemy at half-gun- 
shot distance, the advance division of a reenforcing army 
arrived .... and took position under fire at the point of 
attack; the attacking force was checked, and the battle 
ceased for the day." The reader, not familiar with the 
facts, must necessarily draw two inferences from this state- 
ment: (1) that an entire di\4sion of Buell's army was "at 
the point of attack"; (2) that the presence of such a body 
of fresh troops decided the fate of the day. Both infer- 
ences are erroneous, as the facts will show. 

On one point of some importance, General Buell flatly 
contradicts himself. In speaking of the attack near the 
Landing, Sunday night, he says, in Shiloh Reviewed, that 

* The Century Magazine, Vol. XXXI, p. 749. 



THE BATTLE OF SHILOH H 

the "fire of the gunboats was harmless". In his official • 
report written just after the battle, he says that the "gun- 
boats contributed very much to the result" — the repulse 
of the enemy. 

Perhaps a perfectly fair and unprejudiced account of the 
Battle of Shiloh ought not to have been expected from the 
pen of General Buell. He had, or fancied that he had, 
grievances against both General Grant and General Hal- 
leck — and he was human. 

THE BATTLE OF SHILOH NOT AN ISOLATED INCIDENT 

The Battle of Shiloh was not an isolated incident : it was 
one of a series of incidents, more or less closely related, in 
which the Army of the Tennessee figured prominently and 
effectively, but with divided responsibilities. It is, there- 
fore, proper to take into account conditions precedent to 
the battle before passing judgment upon the men and the 
commanders who happened to be present at the moment, 
and upon whom fell the immediate responsibilities, and 
who suffered for the shortcomings of others. The Army of 
the Tennessee was at Pittsburg Landing under the orders 
of an officer superior in rank to the officer in immediate 
conuuand; and it was there for a definite purpose. If it 
did not accomplish the definite purpose, it may be answered, 
in extemuitiou at least, that it was not pex'mitted to try — 
its hands were tied and it was ordered to "wait". It 
waited imtil compelled to fight for its own safety. It saved 
itself from defeat and, very probably, saved from destruc- 
tion another army of equal strength. 

It is of no consequence who first suggested the line of the 
Tennessee and Cumberland rivers as the weak point in the 
Confederate line between Columbus on the West and Bowl- 
ing Green on the East. It would have been a reflection on 
military genius, if the suggestion liad not come to several 



12 THE BATTLE OP SHILOH 

persons at about the same time — so patent was the evi- 
dence. It is of some importance, however, to remember 
who made the first move to save the "weak point". Just 
seven months before the Battle of Shiloh (September 6, 
1861), the first direct step was taken leading to that event. 

On September 4, 1861, General Grant took command of 
the Cairo district with headquarters at Cairo, General Fre- 
mont being then department commander with headquarters 
at St. Louis. On the day after taking command of the 
district. General Grant learned of an expedition from 
Columbus to occupy Paducah at the mouth of the Ten- 
nessee. A force was at once prepared to anticipate the 
Confederate movement; a dispatch was then sent to head- 
quarters that the force would move at a certain hour unless 
orders were received to the contrary. No order came back, 
and Paducah was occupied without firing a shot on the 
next morning much to the surprise of the inhabitants who 
were hourly expecting the Confederates then on the march. 
General Grant returned to Cairo on the same day, finding 
there the order permitting him to do what was already 
done. The same movement that saved the Tennessee saved 
also the Cumberland. 

Except for this prompt action on the part of General 
Grant the mouths of these two rivers would surely have 
been strongly fortified; but, instead, the Confederate line 
was forced back a hundred miles, in its center, to Fort 
Henry on the Tennessee and Fort Donelson on the Cum- 
berland (Map T). 

Columbus, a few miles below Cairo, strongly fortified and 
garrisoned by the Confederates, was so situated that it 
might, unless threatened from Cairo and Paducah, throw 
troops either west into Missouri or east by rail to Bowling 
Green or to points within easy marching distance of Fort 
Henry and Fort Donelson as there might be need. As a 



THE BATTLE OP SHILOH 13 

result of these conditions, there was activity in Grant's 
district, during the fall and winter months of 1861. The 
battle of Belmont (Nov. 7, 1861) was one of the "diver- 
sions" to keep the garrison at Columbus at home. In the 
following January, General Halleck having become depart- 
ment commander, expeditions were sent out from Cairo 
and Paducah to the rear of Columbus and up the west bank 
of the Tennessee — General C. F. Smith commanding the 
latter expedition. General Smith, having scouted as far 
toward Fort Henry as he thought advisable, went on board 
the gunboat Lexington "to have a look" at the Fort. The 
gimboat went within "about 2i/2 miles .... drawing a 
single shot from the enemy .... in response to four sev- 
eral shots fired at them." In his report (Jan. 22, 1862) 
to General Grant, General Smith said: "I think two iron- 
clad gunboats would make short work of Fort Henry."' 

On the same day that General Smith reported on Fort 
Henry, General Grant was given "permission to visit head- 
quarters" in response to a request made some time before 
— but he soon learned that advice and suggestions in re- 
gard to affairs in his district were not wanted, and he went 
back to his command. He ventured, however (Jan. 28th) 
to send the following to his superior: "With permission, 
I will take Fort Henry . . . and establish and hold a large 
camp there."" Permission was granted on the 30th, and 
Grant was "off up the Tennessee" (February 2nd). 

Except for this appeal for "permission" to take Fort 
Henry, backed by the advice of Flag-Officer Foote, com- 
manding the gunboat flotilla, the expedition would have 
been delayed at least two weeks, giving that much more 
time for the Confederates to strengthen themselves. On 



5 War of the EcbeUion: Official Sccords, Series I, Vol. VII, p. 5 
« War of the Eebellion: Official Eecords, Series I, Vol. VII, p. 



561. 
121. 



14 THE BATTLE OP SHILOII 

the day after the surrender of Fort Henry (February 6) 
Halleck telegraphed to Buell that he "had no idea of com- 
mencing the movement before the 15th or the 20th in- 
stant".'^ And he was evidently very uneasy about the suc- 
cess of the movement, as appears from a dispatch sent to 
the General-in-Chief (McClellan), at Washington at the 
very moment when Foote's guns were pounding at the little 
mud fort. The dispatch was as follows: "If you can 
give me .... 10,000 more men, I will take Fort Henry, cut 
the enemy's line, and paralyze Columbus. Give me 25,000 
and I will threaten Nashville .... so as to force the enemy 
to abandon Bowling Green without a battle. ' ' * Before that 
dispatch was received in Washington the thing was accom- 
plished by a gunljoat bombardment of an hour and fifteen 
minutes at Fort Henry. 

Notwithstanding the fact that the expedition against 
Fort Henry was undertaken before Halleck was ready for 
it and the fact that he had misgivings as to its success, he 
yet seems to have been jealous lest Buell might share in 
the honors in case of success. When Buell learned of the 
movement, which was undertaken without consultation with 
him, he telegraphed Halleck to know if "co-operation" on 
his part was "essential to ... . success," to which Halleck 
replied: "Co-operation at present not essential." ^ Buell 
was piqued at Halleck 's reply, and telegraphed to the Gen- 
eral-in-Chief: "I protest against such prompt proceed- 
ings, as though I had nothing to do but command 'Com- 
mence firing' when he starts off."^" 

This episode is mentioned only for the purpose of show- 
ing that there were i:»ersonal comjilications between these 

7 War of the Eebellion: Official EecorcU, Series I, Vol. VII, p. 593. 

8 War of the KebelUon: Official Becords, Series I, Vol. VII, p. 587. 

9 IFar of the Bebrllion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. VII, pp. 574, 576. 
'0 War of the Eebellion: Official Beeords, Series I, Vol. VII, p. 933. 



THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 15 

three commanders that, possibly, had some bearing ou the 
Battle of Shiloli. The affairs of the succeeding three 
weeks, after Fort Henry, did but complicate the compli- 
cations, and upon General Grant fell the unfavorable 
results. 

No person was more surprised than was General Hal- 
lock at the success of the expedition to Fort Henry, but he 
continued to appeal to the General-in-Chief for "more 
troops" while Grant was preparing to advance upon Fort 
Donelson and after the investment of that place: (February 
8th) without more troops, "I cannot advance on Nash- 
ville"; (February 10th) "Do send me more troops. It is 
the crisis of the war in the West" ; (February 14th) "Can't 
you spare some troops from the Potomac?" " 

Two days after the last appeal. Fort Donelson surren- 
dered, and Clarksville and Nashville waited only to be 
"occupied". They were occupied, respectively, on the 21st 
and 25th, without opposition. Nashville was occupied by 
Nelson's division of Buell's army which was sent to re- 
enforce Grant at Donelson; but, arriving too late, it was 
sent directly forward to Nashville by order of Grant, the 
latter following in person for the purpose of conferring 
with Buell — and this last move came near being the un- 
doing of General Grant who mortally offended his supe- 
rior by pushing the campaign too rapidly, arousing at the 
same time the jealousy of Buell by occupying Nashville 
just ahead of his [Buell's] army approaching from the 
North. General Grant was in "ahead of the hounds", at 
Nashville — that was his only offense. 

FROM FORT DONELSON TO SHILOH 

On the day that Nashville was occupied by the Union 
troops (February 25) the Confederates began the evacu- 

11 War of the SebelUon: Official Becords, Series I, Vol. VII, pp. 594, 599, 612. 



16 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 

ation of Columbus, the last defense on the original line, 
and began at once to establish a new line along the Mobile 
and Ohio Eailroad from Columbus southward to Corinth 
and from Memphis eastward through Corinth to Chatta- 
nooga on the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, with Gen- 
eral Beauregard in command, Corinth being the strategical 
point at the crossing of the two roads (Map I). 

After the evacuation of Nashville the Confederates un- 
der General Johnston moved southward as rapidly as pos- 
sible, striking the Memphis and Charleston road at Decatur, 
thence moving west to Corinth, the advance reaching that 
place March 18th. General Johnston reached Corinth on 
the 24th, assuming command of the combined Confederate 
forces on the 29th. 

The commanders of the two Union armies, Halleck and 
Buell, after Nashville, did not fully agree as to the best 
plan of following up the advantages already gained. Buell 
thought, with the General-in-Chief (McClellan), that Chat- 
tanooga was of "next importance" after Nashville'- and 
he prepared to follow Johnston south. Halleck thought 
that the line of the Tennessee River offered the opportunity 
to strike the enemy's center at or near Corinth ^^ and he 
urged Buell to join him in that movement, but without avail. 
A few days later, however. General Halleck secured what 
he had long desired, the consolidation of the two Depart- 
ments with himself in command. Halleck urged his claims 
on two grounds: (1) that all of the armies of the West 
should be under one command, and (2) that the command 
should fall to him in recognition of the successful campaign 
against Fort Henry and Fort Donelson in his Department.^* 
The consolidation took place on March 11th, after which 

12 War of the BcheJlion: Official Hecnrds, Scries I, Vol. VII, p. 660. 

" War of the Bchellion: Official Eecords, Series I, Vol. X, Part II, p. 38. 

14 War of the Reiellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. VII, p. 628. 



THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 17 

date General Buell was subject to orders from St. Louis, 
as General Grant had been from the first. General Buell 's 
advance southward from Nashville had reached Columbia 
on Duck River before the consolidation (March 10), but 
his headquarters were still at Nashville. 

On the first of March it appears that General Halleck 
notified General Grant that his column would move "up 
the Tennessee", and that the main object would be "to de- 
stroy the railroad bridge over Bear Creek, near Eastport 
.... and also the connections at Corinth, Jackson, and 
numl)oldt." He was instructed to "Avoid any general en- 
gagement with strong forces . . . better .... retreat than 
risk a general battle ".'° Two days later. General Halleck 
sent to the General-in-Chief the complaint against General 
Grant, which resulted in the latter's practical suspension 
from active command, Halleck suggesting at the same time 
that General C. F. Smith command the expedition up the 
Tennessee. In response to Halleck 's complaint, he was 
authorized to put General Grant under arrest, "if the good 
of the service requires it", to which Halleck replied: "I 
do not deem it advisable to arrest him at present".'" On 
the fourth of March, Halleck dispatched to Grant: "You 
will place Maj. Gen. C. F. Smith in command of expedition 
and remain yourself at Fort Henry." To this. Grant re- 
]>lio(l, on the next day: "Troops will be sent, imder com- 
mand of Major-General Smith, as directed. I had prepared 
a different plan, intending General Smith to command the 
forces which will go to Paris and Humboldt, while I would 
command the expedition upon Eastport, Corinth, and Jack- 
son in person." He then assures General Halleck that 
instructions will be carried out "to the very best" of his 
ability.'^ 

IS War of the Rebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. VII, p. 674. 

i« Jiar of the Rebclliori: Official Records, Scriog I, Vol. VII, pp. 680, 682. 

1' yVar of the Rebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, Part II, pp. 3-5. 



18 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 

Under this order of his superior, General Grant re- 
mained at Fort Henry, acting in the capacity of a forward- 
ing-ofiScer, until the 17th of the month — the most impor- 
tant two weeks between the date of the order to proceed 
up the Tennessee and the 6th of April following, when the 
camp was attacked at Pittsburg Landing. The expedition 
was planned without consultation with General Grant, com- 
mander of the district, and it was directed, except in minor 
details, from headquarters in St. Louis both before and 
after March 17th — the date of General Grant's restora- 
tion to active command of the army in the field. 

The expedition left Fort Henry on March 9th under 
command of General Smith, with full authority from the 
Department commander to select the place of landing.^* 
General Smith established headquarters at Savannah, on 
the east bank of the river, but sent one division (General 
Lew. Wallace) five miles farther up to Crump's Landing 
on the west bank of the river, where his division went into 
camp on the 12th. On the 13th Wallace sent an expedition 
west about fifteen miles to the Mobile and Ohio Railway 
near Bethel station, where about a half-mile of trestle work 
was destroyed.!" rpj^g damage to the road was slight, how- 
ever, as repairs were soon made. (Map I.) 

On the 14th General Smith reported that he had "not 
been able to get anything like the desired information as 
to the strength of the enemy, but it seems to be quoted at 
50,000 to 60,000 from Jackson through Corinth and farther 
east." It was this information that induced General Smith 
"not to attempt to cut the commimication at that place, 
[Corinth] as that would inevitably lead to a collision in 
numbers" that he was "ordered to avoid".-" Immediately 

IS War of the SeheJUon: Official Secords, Series I, Vol. X. Part II, pp. 21-26. 
i» War of the Seiellion: Official Becords, Series I, Vol. X. Part I, pp. 9, 10. 
50 War of the MehelUon: Official Kecords, Series I, Vol. X, Part I, p. 8. 



THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 19 

after this report was made, General Sherman was ordered 
with his division to a point some distance above Pittsburg 
Landing, with instructions to cut the Memphis and Charles- 
ton road, if possible, at some point east of Corinth. The 
attempt failed on acount of high water and Sherman 
dropped back to Pittsburg Landing, where he met Hurl- 
but 's division sent up by General Smith as support in case 
of need. The two divisions left the boats at Pittsburg 
Landing and went into camp. General Sherman sent out a 
strong recouuoitering force toward Corinth, and on the 
17th he reported to General Smith: "I am satisfied we 
cannot reach the Memphis and Charleston Road without a 
considerable engagement, which is prohibited by General 
Ilalleck's instructions, so that I will be governed by your 
orders of yesterday to occupy Pittsburg strongly."-' 

General Lew. Wallace, whose division was at Crump's 
Landing at this time, says in his Autobiography that if Gen- 
eral Smith had received the order from Halleck that he 
expected, to move directly on Corinth, "there had been no 
battle of Shiloh." And again he says that by the 
time General Grant was restored to command, the oppor- 
tunity of advancing on Corinth was "going, if not already 
gone"." 

General Grant was restored to active command on March 
17th, and going at once to General Smith's headquarters 
at Savannah lie reported on the 18th the distribution of 
troops as he found it — three divisions on the west side 
of the Tennessee, Sherman and Hurlbut at Pittsbui-g Land- 
ing, and Lew. Wallace at Crump's Landing; at Savannah, 
on the east side of the river was McClernand's division; 
and on transports on the river, waiting for orders, were 
several regiments which were ordered to Pittsburg Land- 
s' If'ar of the SebelHon: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, Part I, p. 25. 
2= Wallace 'a Autobiography, Vol. I, pp. 446, 47A. 



20 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 

ing. It is important to remember this distribution of the 
army as General Grant found it, under the sanction if not 
the direct order of the Department commander. That Gen- 
eral Halleck still believed it possible to cut the Memphis 
and Charleston Eailroad, according to his original plan, is 
shown by a dispatch to General Grant (March 18th) based 
on a rumor to the effect that the enemy had moved from 
Corinth to attack the line of the Tennessee below Savannah, 
that is, to attack Grant's communications. "If so," says 
General Halleck, "General Smith should immediately de- 
stroy railroad connection at Corinth." -^ To this General 
Grant replied on the 19th: "Immediate preparations will 
be made to execute your .... order. I will go in person".^* 
Again, on the next day in a lengthy dispatch to Halleck 's 
Adjutant General, Grant repeated his intention to go "in 
person" with the expedition "should no orders received 
hereafter prevent it" — adding that he would "take no 
risk .... under the instructions" which he already had; 
that if a battle seemed to be inevitable, he could "make a 
movement upon some other point of the railroad .... and 
thus save the demoralizing effect of a retreat ".^^ 

General Halleck evidently thought there was special sig- 
nificance in Grant's intention to "go in person" with the 
expedition toward Corinth — he knew something would be 
doing — so, on the 20th Halleck dispatched: "keep your 
forces together until you connect with General Buell .... 
Don't let the enemy draw you into an engagement now." ~° 

Before this last dispatch was received, orders were issued 
by General Grant to all division commanders to hold them- 
selves ready to march at a moment's notice, with three days' 

23 War of the Rebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, Part II, p. 46. 
"i War of the Rebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, Part II, p. 49. 
=s War of the Rebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, Part II, p. 51. 
20 War of the Rebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, Part II, pp. 50-51. 



THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 21 

rations in haversacks and seven days' rations in wagons. 
On receiving the "wait" order, Grant dispatched again 
(March 21) : "Corinth cannot be taken without meeting a 
large force, say 30,000. A general engagement would be 
inevitable; therefore I will wait a few days for further 
instructions."-^ Evidently General Grant was restive and 
anxious, believing that precious time was going to waste, 
as appears from what he wrote to General Smith: "the 
sooner we attack the easier will be the task".^* 

As far as the records show, no orders later than March 
20th were received by General Grant; and so the army 
within striking distance of the enemy was in a state of sus- 
pended animation for nearly three weeks. The army was 
expected to cut the Memphis and Charleston road, but it 
was not permitted to fight for the purpose; it must do it 
without disturbing the enemy. 

It is important to remember in this connection that the 
territory west of the Tennessee River, from near its mouth 
southward to Pittsburg Landing and west to the Missis- 
sippi, was the enemy's coimtry both in sentiment and by 
strong military occupation, and so the expedition under 
Oeneral Smith up the Tennessee was moving fully two 
hundred miles from its base of supplies, wholly dependent 
upon the river. This territory was well supplied with rail- 
roads under control of the enemy, by means of which, if so 
disposed, he might throw a strong force on short notice 
against General Smith's communications. General Grant 
evidently had this danger in mind when replying to General 
Ilalleck's order sending the expedition up the river, as al- 
ready quoted. But in this as in other things. General 
Grant's advice was not sought and his suggestions were 
not heeded. The conditions at Pittsburg Landing were 

2' War of the Sebellion: Official Becords, Series I, Vol. X, Part II, p. 55. 
28 n'ar of the Sebellion: Official Becords, Series I, Vol. X, Part II, p. 62. 



22 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 

not of Ms making — they were accepted as they were founds 
even after three requests to be relieved of command in the 
Department, because of the strained relations between his- 
superior and himself.-* 

GENERAL BUBLl's MOVEMENTS 

In pursuance of his plan after Nashville, to follow the 
enemy south, on March 10th, General Buell reported his 
advance at Columbia, Tennessee, at the crossing of Duck 
River.^** The consolidation of the two Departments oc- 
curred on the 11th, and on the 13th, General Halleck, as if 
in some degree appreciating General Buell 's embarrass- 
ment, wrote him as follows: "The new arrangement of 
departments will not' interfere with your command. You 
will continue in command of the same army and district of 
country as heretofore, so far as I am concerned." ^^ Defi- 
nite orders to General Buell soon followed the consolida- 
tion ; March 16th : ' ' Move your forces by land to the Ten- 
nessee .... Grant's army is concentrating at Savannah." 
Again on March 20th: "important that you communicate 
with General Smith as soon as possible." And again on 
March 29th: "You will concentrate all your available 
troops at Savannah, or Pittsburg, 12 miles above." '- 

As already stated, General Buell had one division at 
Columbia — about forty miles on the road to Savannah — 
when the order came to join Grant. The remainder of the 
army moved promptly, but was detained at the crossing of 
Duck River in building a bridge until the 30th, though one 
division (Nelson's) waded the river on the 29th. 

=» The several requests to be relieverl of command in Halleck's department 
bear date of March 7, 9, and 11.— War of the Rebellion: Official Records, Se- 
ries I, Vol. X, Part II, pp. 15, 21, 30. 

30 jrar of the Rebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, Part II, p. 25. 

31 War of the Rebellion : Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, Part II, p. 33. 

32 War of the Rebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol X, Part II, pp. 42, 51, 



THE BATTLE OP SHILOH 23 

Naturally General Grant, in front of a rapidly concen- 
trating army under General Johnston and General Beaure- 
gard, was anxious to know of General Buell's movements, 
and so, two days after assuming active command, two cou- 
riers were started from Savannah for Buell's camp which 
was reached on the 23d with this dispatch from Grant: "I 
am massing troops at Pittsburg, Tennessee. There is every 
reason to suppose that the rebels have a large force at 
Corinth, Miss., and many at other points on the road 
toward Decatur. "^^ Thus General Buell had positive 
knowledge both from General Halleck and General Grant 
that the latter was "massing troops" at Pittsburg Landing 
— and this information was in possession of General Buell 
a full week before his army was able to cross Duck River 
(about 90 miles away) and two weeks before the battle. 
This point is dwelt upon for the reason that certain writers 
have erroneously claimed that General Buell had not been 
informed of General Grant's position on the west bank of 
the Tennessee and hence did not press his march. 

After wading Duck River as stated, General Nelson's 
division went into camp for the night, and took up the 
march next morning (the 30th) reaching Savannah about 
noon, April 5th, having marched an average of twelve miles 
a day. ^^ General Buell arrived in Savannah "about sun- 
down", on the same day, but he did not make his presence 
known, nor was his presence known to General Grant, when 
the latter, with his staff, took boat next morning for the 
battle field after an "early breakfast" left unfinished. 
It need not be matter of surprise that General Buell 

as War of the Rcbdlion: Official Hccords. Series T, Vol. X, Part II, p. 47. 

s« The following is the itinerary of General Nelson's march from Columbia, 
as given by Colonel Ammen, commanding the advance brigade: March 30, 4 
miles; March 31, 10 miles; April 1, 14 miles; April 2, 16 miles; April 3, 15 
miles: .'\pril 4, lO'A miles; April 5, Qi'o miles. — .'Vmmen 's Diary in War of the 
BebeUion: Official Secords, Series I, Vol. X, Part I, p. 330. 



24 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 

should be reluctant to join his army of about equal strength 
and independent in command with the army on the Ten- 
nessee. It was Buell's wish to strike the Tennessee higher 
up and conduct a campaign of his own. With this in mind 
he suggested to General Halleck that he [Buell] be per- 
mitted to halt and go into camp about thirty miles east of 
Savannah, at Waynesboro. To this suggestion General 
Halleck replied on the 5th: "You are right about concen- 
trating at Waynesborough. Future movements must de- 
pend upon those of the enemy." ^^ General Buell issued 
orders to "concentrate", but fortunately his advance had 
passed the point designated before the orders were deliv- 
ered, and the march continued. Had it been otherwise the 
reenforcing army would have been forty miles away, in- 
stead of its advance division being within ten miles, when 
the battle began. 

It may be asked: "Why did not General Buell make his 
presence in Savannah known to General Grant promptly 
on arrival! Perhaps a perfectly just answer cannot be 
given in view of the fact that the former was not required 
to "report" to the latter as a subordinate to a superior — 
the one was to join the other and wait for orders from a 
higher source than either. There was but one contingency 
under which any part of General Buell's army could come 
under General Grant's orders — an attack upon the latter. 
General Halleck 's instructions to General Grant were 
(April 5th) : "You will act in concert, but he [Buell] will 
exercise his separate command, unless the enemy should 
attack you. In that case you are authorized to take the 
general command." ^^ The contingency arose on the morn- 
ing of the 6th. 

35 War of the EebelUon : Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, Part II, pp. 94, 95. 
30 ll'ar of the Eehellion: Offidal Records, Series I, Vol. X, Part II, p. 94. 



THE BATTLE OP SHILOH 25 

BEFORE THE BATTLE 

From the date of General Halleck's "wait" order to the 
date of the battle — that is from March 20th to April 6th — 
there were fifteen full days, during which time this positive 
order was in force : ' ' My instructions not to advance must 
be obeyed." Nothing, therefore, remained but to watch 
the enemy and dodge him in case he offered battle in any 
considerable force. There was scarcely a day in that wait- 
ing time in which there was not reconnoitering, resulting in 
several light encounters. Colonel Buckland, commanding 
the fourtli brigade of General Sherman's division, has given 
a good account of the condition of things at the front dur- 
ing the three or four days before the battle in a paper read 
before the Society of the Army of the Tennessee in 1881 
and jjublished in the Proceedings of the Society .^'^ 

On Thursday, April 3d, three days before the battle and 
the day on which the Confederates marched from Corinth 
and surrounding camps, Colonel Buckland under orders of 
the division commander reconnoitered four or five miles 
toward Corinth, finding the enemy in such force as to deter 
him from attack, in view of the order to "fall back" rather 
than risk bringing on a general engagement. The brigade 
marched back without an encounter. On the next day the 
picket line was attacked in front of Buckland's brigade, 
and a picket post was captured, consisting of a Lieutenant 
and seven men. Colonel Buckland went out with a regi- 
ment to investigate and had two of his companies sur- 
rounded by Confederate cavalry, which was in turn sur- 
prised and routed by the reenforcements sent to the relief 
of the two companies. Just as the enemy appeared to be 
forming for a counter attack on Buckland, the Fifth Ohio 
cavalry of Sherman's division came up, attacked and routed 

" Proceedings of the Society of the Army of the Tennessee, Vol. XIV-XVI, 
p. 71. 



26 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 

the enemy, capturing several prisoners. This affair devel- 
oped the presence of the enemy in considerable force — 
infantry, cavalry, and artillery. When Colonel Bnckland 
reached the picket line, on his return to camp, he found 
General Sherman with several regiments awaiting him and 
wanting to know, with a show of displeasure, what he had 
been doing out in front. After hearing Colonel Buckland's 
account of the matter, he was ordered back to camp with 
his men. General Sherman accompanying the order with 
the remark that he might have brought on a general engage- 
ment, which is to be understood as a mild reprimand. 

So i3articular was General Sherman to avoid censure 
that he required Colonel Buckland to make a written report 
of the incident which report was sent to General Grant. 

Colonel Buckland further says that he was along the 
picket line several times on Saturday, the day before the 
battle, and saw the enemy at several points, and that the 
pickets reported activity near the lines. Other officers 
made similar observations. "It was the belief of all", says 
Colonel Buckland, "that the enemy intended to attack us, 
either during the night or early in the morning".^^ This 
feeling was so strong that regimental officers were instruct- 
ed to have their commands in readiness for attack — the 
picket line was strengthened and a line of sentries was 
established from the picket line back to camp. 

Similar evidence as to the activity of the enemy on Sat- 
urday the 5th is furnished by Captain I. P. Eumsey, a staff 
officer of General W. H. L. Wallace, who was riding outside 
the lines on that day. On returning to camp Captain Rum- 
sey reported to Colonel Dickey, 4th Illinois cavalry, that he 
had seen a considerable body of Confederate cavalry. The 
two officers going to General Sherman's headquarters, re- 

38 Proceedings of the Society of the Army of the Tainessee, Vol. XIV-XVI, 
p. 77. 



THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 27 

ported the facts, to which General Sherman replied: "I 
know they are out there, but our hands are tied; we can't 
do a thing." Colonel Dickey then asked permission to take 
his regiment out to investigate, receiving for reply: 
"Dickey, if you were to go out there with your regiment 
you would bring on a battle in less than an hour, and we 
have positive orders not to be drawn into a battle until 
Buell comes." ** 

Colonel McPherson, Halleck's chief engineer, who was 
camping with the second division (W. H. L. Wallace) fully 
corroborates the above statements, by saying: "It was 
well known the enemy was approaching our lines".*" 

Apprehension of an early attack upon the camp pre- 
vailed among the subordinate officers of General Prentiss's 
division, as well as among those of General Sherman's 
division, and similar orders were given to companies and 
regiments to be prepared for a night or an early morning 
attack. And it seems now to be well settled that the recon- 
noitering party sent out from Prentiss's division before 
daylight on Sunday morning was sent out by Colonel Pea- 
body of the 25th Missouri, commanding the first brigade 
of the division, and without the knowledge of General 
Prentiss. 

In the history of the 25th Missouri, edited and compiled 
by Dr. W. A. Neal, Assistant Surgeon of the regiment, and 
published in 1889, appears a detailed account of the action 
of Colonel Peabody on the eve of the battle, as related by 
Lieutenant James M. Newhard, at the time Orderly Ser- 
geant of Company E, 25th Missouri, one of the companies 
in the reconnoitering party. It is related that Colonel Pea- 
body urged upon General Prentiss on Saturday the 5th 

»» Quoted by Major D. W. Reed in a paper published in the Proceedings of 
the Society of the Army of the Tennessee, Vol. XXXVI, p. 216. 

*o War of the ScbcUion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, Part I, p. 181. 



28 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 

that an attack was very probable and that preparation 
ought to be made accordingly. As nothing was done except 
to strengthen pickets and guards Colonel Peabody, under 
the influence of a premonition that an attack would be made 
early in the morning and that he would not survive the bat- 
tle, decided to take upon himself the responsibility of send- 
ing out a party to reconnoiter. So Major Powell, an officer 
of the Eegular Army and Field Officer of the Day was 
ordered to take three companies of the 25th Missouri, start 
at about 3 o'clock in the morning, and march until he found 
the enemy. The companies constituting the party were B, 
H, and E, of the 25th Missouri. How and where the enemy 
was found' will be related farther on. 

Some persons will have doubts, probably, in regard to 
the story of Colonel Peabody 's premonitions of attack, and 
death in battle, but there can be no doubt about the attack, 
or about the death of Colonel Peabody, within a few min- 
utes after the main battle began. Major Powell was also 
killed early in the battle, and so the two principal actors 
in the first scene of the drama passed quickly ofi the stage, 
but not until after the chief of the two was severely repri- 
manded, at the head of his brigade in line and waiting for 
orders. The following letter, to a nephew of Colonel Pea- 
body, here given by permission, tells the story. 

333 Highlaud Av. 
SoMERViLLE, Mass. Feby. 27th 1902 
Mr. F. E. Peabody, 

Box 7 Boston. 
Dear Sir: 

Referring to our conversation concerning the Battle of Pitts- 
burg Landing, Tennesi3ee, April 6 & 7, 1862, I have to state that: 
Everett Peabody, Colonel of the 25th Mo. Vol. Inft., was in com- 
mand of the first Brigade 6th Division and I was senior Captain 
of the regiment. 

At early morn before breakfast the line of Battle was formed, 



THE BATTLE OP SIIILOII 29 

with the right of I5i-igade resting oa the right of our regimental 
color line. My company was on the right of Brigade. A few min- 
utes after the line was formed, General Prentiss rode up near 
Colonel Peabody, who was mounted and in front of my company, 
about tlie center of the first platoon and said to him, "Colonel 
Peabody, I hold you responsible for bringing on this fight." 
Saluting, Colonel Peabody -said: "If I brought on the fight I am 
able to lead the van." General Prentiss ordered him to take his 
best regiment .... the next words I heard were: "25th Missouri, 
forward. ' ' 

Signed Yours respectfully, 

F. C. Nichols, 
Captain U. S. Army, Retired; 
formerly Major & Capt. 25th Mo. 
Vol. Inf. War of '61 & 5. 

This letter by Capt. Nichols makes clear and positive 
two important points: (1) that General Prentiss, like Gen- 
eral Sherman, was impressed with the idea that, under 
General Halleck's orders the enemy was to be avoided 
rather than sought out, and he reprimanded his brigade 
commander for doing, irregularly, the very thing that saved 
the army from the "surprise" about which so many un- 
truths have been told; (2) the letter makes it clear that 
Prentiss's division was neither in bed nor at breakfast, 
when the attack came — it was in line "before breakfast", 
and the enemy was received with a hot fire, as will appear. 

Prentiss's reprimand of Colonel Peabody was, doubtless, 
prompted by the same sense of responsibility as was that 
administered by General Sherman to Colonel Buckland, al- 
ready mentioned. It had been ' ' ground into ' ' each division 
commander, so to speak, that, "in no case" were they "to 
be drawn into an engagement." 

There was another incident in the activities immediately 
procodiiig the battle, more important than anything yet 
mentioned, which, however, was not revealed, until forty 



30 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 

years later — an incident which, had it been known when 
and by whom it should have been known, the Battle of 
Shiloh would have had a different story to tell. We now 
know, though the knowledge is comparatively recent but 
entirely reliable, that General Lew. Wallace, commanding 
the second division of the army at Crump's Landing, had 
positive information of the movement of the Confederate 
army to attack Grant on the very day that the movement 
began — information brought directly to him by one trust- 
ed scout and confirmed by a second. During two full days 
and three nights ("for three days and nights," to quote 
his langua,ge) he "simmers" this all-important information 
in his mind, trying to determine how he could best reenforce 
the comrades beyond Snake Creek in case of need. 

General Wallace tells in his Autobiography how and when 
the information came to him of the movement of the Con- 
federate army from Corinth as follows : 

"About as the sun set, Thursday, the 4th [3d], Bell the 
scout came into my tent, evidently the worse for a hard 

ride, and said, abruptly, 'I bring you news, sir The 

whole rebel army is on the way up from Corinth They 

set out this morning early. By this time they are all on 
the road .... batteries and all.' This important informa- 
tion was confirmed by another scout (Carpenter) : 'John- 
ston's cut loose and is making for Pittsburg.' " ^^ 

General Wallace says that he sent this information by 
his orderly, on the same evening to Pittsburg Landing, 
with instructions in case Grant was not found to leave the 
dispatch with the postmaster, to be delivered next morning. 
General Wallace's excuse for not sending a proper officer 
with positive orders to find Grant, seems almost too puerile 
to be credited — he did not want to appear "officious". 
The dispatch never reached its proper destination, and the- 

<i Wallace's Autobiography, Vol. I, pp. 454-456. 



THE BATTLE OP SHILOH 31 

secret was in the keeping of General Wallace until he dis- 
closed it in his Autobiography. For his own reputation, it 
might better have died with him. A dispatch boat was at 
all times at Wallace's headquarters, subject to his orders, 
and there should have been no difficulty in the way of find- 
ing General Grant within two hours, whether at the Land- 
ing above or Savannah below. It is worth remembering in 
this connection that the orderly sent with this dispatch 
went by the river road and over Snake Creek bridge which 
had been repaired on that very day under direction of 
Colonel ^IcPherson, Halleck's chief engineer. General 
Wallace pleaded ignorance of this road, two days later, in 
excusing himself for marching his division over the wrong 
road. 

THE UNION ABMY AND THE FIEU) 

To understand and properly appreciate the difficulties 
under which the Battle of Shiloh was fought on the Union 
side, the composition of the Army and the topography of 
the field must both be considered. The Army of the Ten- 
nessee as it was camped in the woods above Pittsburg 
Landing on Sunday morning, April 6, 1862, was never in a 
camp of organization and instruction, as an Army — it 
grew by accretion, beginning at Fort Donelson in the mid- 
dle of February preceding. Some of the regiments that 
stormed the enemy's works at Donelson dropped into line 
for the first time vinder fire, and only a few hours before 
the assault was made. In like manner new and untrained 
regiments and batteries came, one by one, to swell the 
ranks at Shiloh, even after the roar of battle sounded 
through the woods, taking their assigned places under fire. 
The division (Prentiss's 6th) from which the reconnoitering 
party went out before daylight on Sunday morning to ' ' sur- 
prise" the enemy was the newest of the new, having but 



32 THE BATTLE OP SHILOH 

two organized brigades — though there was enougli "raw 
material" assigned to the division for a third brigade, not 
all on the ground, however, when the battle began. Atten- 
tion is called to these facts for the reason that they should 
be taken into account in passing judgment upon the Battle 
of Sliiloh. 

Besides the lack of organization and drill of the army 
the character of the field upon which the battle was fought 
should be considered. It has been said with much truth 
that a clear understanding of the Battle of Shiloh cannot be 
had without studying the movements on the ground. A 
written description can convey only a very general idea of 
the plateau upon which the battle was fought ; hence a map 
showing the principal streams, roads, open fields, etc., is 
added to aid the study of the positions and movements. 
(Map II.) 

The plateau, rising eighty to one hundred feet above the 
Tennessee on the east, was surrounded by almost impassa- 
ble barriers on all sides — except an opening to the south- 
west, two and a half to three miles in width. The phiteau 
sheds its waters west, north, and east — west and north- 
west into Owl Creek; north into Snake Creek; and east 
into the Tennessee. The creeks were effectually guarded 
by swampy margins and heavy timber, or by a combination 
of the three — timber, under-brush, and swamp. They ad- 
mitted of no crossing except by bridges, of which there was 
one on each of the streams leading to and from the battle 
field. The Tennessee could be crossed only by boat, as the 
army had never been supplied with pontoons. 

This plateau, bordered as described, was cut into numer- 
ous gullies and ravines by small spring-branches, running 
to all points of the compass in finding their tortuous ways 
to the larger streams. Most of these spring-branches ran 
through marshy ground — impassable in the early spring 



THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 33 

except where bridged. Some of the ravines were deep, miry, 
and so densely choked with briers and brambles as to defy 
invasion by anything much larger than a rabbit. The hill- 
sides and the ridges were covered with timber and under- 
brush, except where small farms were under cultivation. 
There was not an elevation anywhere on the three miles 
square from which a general view could be had. Wide 
flanking movements were impossible to either army, and 
cavalry was practically useless. The Landing itself was a 
mud bank at the foot of a steep bluff, a single road winding 
around the bluff and up the hillside to higher ground. At a 
distance of about a half-mile from the Landing the road 
forked and a little further on struck the Hamburg and 
Savannah road, running nearly parallel with the river. 
Still further on the Corinth road crossed the Hamburg and 
Purdy road and struck the Bark Road, one branch three 
miles out and the other branch four miles out. Besides 
these main roads shown on the map, there were numerous 
farm roads winding around on the ridges, and the needs of 
the army made many new roads — all were deep in mud 
made of the most tenacious clay, so that the unloading of 
boats and the hauling to camp was a slow and laborious 
process for both man and mule. 

Had John Codman Ropes understood the topography and 
other conditions of the field of Shiloh, he woiild hardly 
have ventured to criticise General Johnston for making a 
front attack upon the commands of Hurlbut, Prentiss, and 
Wallace, and for failing to force his way along the Ham- 
burg and Savannah road on the Union left at an earlier 
hour. Oonoral Johnston had no choice but to make a front 
attack and he did his best to force his way along the Ham- 
burg and Savannah Road, toward the Landing at the ear- 
liest possible hour. Why and how he failed to accomplish 
his main object, before the close of the day, will appear 



34 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 

later. The ground between the Hamburg and Savannah 
Eoad and the river was much broken — so much so that 
there were but two or three cultivated fields on that part 
of the plateau. 

THE CONFEDEEATE AEMY AND ITS OBJECTIVE 

As already stated, after the surrender of Fort Donelson 
and the evacuation of Nashville General Johnston's army 
fell back as rapidly as possible southward to the line of the 
Memphis and Charleston Railroad with a view to joining 
General Beauregard, who commanded the territory west 
of the Tennessee River with headquarters at Corinth. By 
the last week in March there had been concentrated at Cor- 
inth and in the vicinity an army of 40,000 effective men, and 
General Johnston took command on the 29th of March with 
General Beauregard second in command. The object to be 
accomplished by this army was to attack and defeat Grant's 
army before the arrival of Buell, then on the march from 
Nashville with 37,000 men, following up this anticipated 
success with the defeat of Buell, thus opening the way back 
to Nashville so recently evacuated. The movement from 
Corinth and surrounding camps to attack Grant began in 
the early morning of April 3d, with a view to making the 
attack early on the 5th. Bad weather and bad roads de- 
layed the attack twenty-four hours — to Sunday morning, 
April 6th. How the expected "surprise" of Grant's army 
was anticipated will now be told. 

THE BATTLE 

It is not the purpose to describe in detail the movements 
of the battle throughout the two days, but only to touch 
upon salient features. One of the salient features, and not 
the least important, is that of the action of the reconnoiter- 
ing party heretofore referred to as having been sent out 



THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 35 

before daylight on Sunday morning from Prentiss's divi- 
sion. General Prentiss in bis official report makes no men- 
tion of the Powell party, but he says that " at 3 o 'clock .... 
Col. David Moore, Twenty-first Missouri, with five com- 
panies of his infantry regiment, proceeded to the front, and 
at break of day the advance pickets were driven in".*^ 

C olonel Moore, in his official report, says that he was 
ordered out by Colonel Peabody, commanding the First 
Brigade, "at about 6 o'clock", to support the picket guard 
which "had been attacked and driven in". It appears to 
be certain, therefore, that both the reconnoitering party 
imder Major Powell and the support under Colonel Moore 
were ordered out by Colonel Peabody without consulting 
the division commander ; hence the reprimand above quoted 
— heard and remembered by many others besides Captain 
Nichols. Colonel Moore's command was a reenforcing not 
a reconnoitering party. 

The line of march of the Powell party may be traced on 
the map (No. II) along the road passing the camp of the 
'25th Missouri, past the southeast corner of Rhea Field and 
the north side of Seay Field, passing the picket line at the 
forks of the road and striking the corner of Fraley Field 
a few rods farther on. From this point the videttes of the 
Confederate picket, under Major Hardeastle of Hardee's 
corps were encountered. The videttes fired upon the ad- 
vancing party and retired to the picket line at the south- 
west corner of Fraley Field. The fight between the picket 
post and Powell's party began at once, though it was still 
quite dark — "too dark to see, in the timber and under- 
brusli", so the firing at first was at random. As there never 
was an official report made of the part taken by the Powell 
reconnoitering party, as both the officer ordering it out and 

42 War of the BebcUion: Official Eecords, Series I, Vol. X, Part I, p. 278. 



36 THE BATTLE OP SHILOH 

the officer commanding it were killed early in the main bat- 
tle, we must rely upon the report of the officer commanding 
the Confederate picket at Fraley Field for the incidents of 
that encounter. Major Hardcastle says the firing began 
"about dawn" (at 4:55 in fact), and he says: "We fought 
the enemy an hour or more without giving an inch". "At 
about 6:30" he saw the brigade formed behind him and 
"fell back". The casualties in Major Hardcastle 's com- 
mand were four killed and nineteen wounded.*^ The cas- 
ualties in the Powell party were never certainly known. 

This stubborn picket fight seems to have been something 
of a "surprise" to at least one of the Confederate generals. 
General Bragg, commanding the second line of attack, says 
in his official report that "the enemy did not give us time 
to discuss the question of attack, for soon after dawn he 
commenced a rapid musketry fire on our pickets." ** Major 
Hardcastle, commanding this picket line, says : ' ' The enemy 
opened a heavy fire on us at a distance of about two hundred 
yards ".''^ That the Confederate line was not ready to move 
forward at once when the firing began appears from Major 
Hardcastle 's official report. He says: "At about 6:30 a. 
m. I saw the brigade formed in my rear and fell back."^*' 
So there was a full hour and a half elapsed between the be- 
ginning of the firing and the movement forward. The bat- 
tle front, two and a half to three miles in extent with a 
curtain of skirmishers, advanced to the attack. Major Pow- 
ell's party and the Union pickets that joined him fell slowly 
back, carrying their dead and wounded until they met 
Colonel Moore with five companies of his regiment (21st 
Missouri). Colonel Moore taking command, sent back for 

13 War of the ScbeUion: Official Eecords, Series I, Vol. X, Part I, p. 603. 

44 War of the EebcUion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, Part I, p. 46-1. 

45 War of the HcbcUion: Official Hecords, Series I, Vol. X, Part I, p. 60.3. 
48 War of the Rebellion : Official Jtecords, Series I, Vol. X, Part I, p. 603. 



THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 37 

the other five companies of his regiment, under Lieutenant 
Colonel AVoodyard. The force now consisted of the 21st 
Missouri, three companies of the 25th Missouri, four com- 
panies of the 16th Wisconsin, and two companies of the 12th 
Michigan — all infantry. This force formed in Seay Field 
and advanced to a point near the northwest corner of the 
field, where the Confederate skirmishers were encountered, 
the 8th and 9th Arkansas. (Map III.) There was a sharp 
fight at this point lasting about thirty minutes, in which 
Colonel Moore was severely wounded. Lieutenant Mann 
of the same regiment was wounded, and Captain Saxe (16th 
Wisconsin) was killed — the first Union officer killed in 
the battle of Shiloh. 

As the Confederates advanced, the little Union force 
moved slowly back across Shiloh Branch, forming again at 
a point about two hundred yards from the southeast corner 
of Rhea Field, where the remainder of Peabody's brigade 
was in line. This position was held from a half hour to an 
hour against two brigades (Shaver's and Wood's). While 
fallinj!f back in line from this point Major King (21st Mis- 
souri) was mortally wounded. Meantime, General Prentiss 
had formed the remainder of his division (Miller's brigade) 
and had advanced about eighty rods from the front of his 
camp to the south side of Spain Field (Map III), where he 
was joined by Peabody's brigade, Powell's party, and the 
pickets. The division, now consisting of seven regiments 
and two batteries, was here attacked by four brigades — 
Wood, Shaver, Gladden, and Chalmers — comprising 
twenty regiments and three batteries. Against this tre- 
mendous odds tlie position was held for about thirty min- 
utes, when the division fell back to the line of the camp 
where another stand of about thirty minutes was made, the 
division finally retiring at about nine o'clock — more than 



38 THE BATTLE OP SHILOH 

five hours after the reconnoitering party marched out. 
Among the casualties on the Union side in front of Pren- 
tiss's division were Colonel Peabody and Major Powell, 
killed; and on the Confederate side General Gladden was 
mortally wounded. 

There is ample testimony in the official reports of Con- 
federate officers to show that the resistance met by their 
several commands in the slow advance from the picket line 
had none of the features of a sham battle. There were 
many casualties on both sides — how many was never cer- 
tainly known. There was no bayoneting of Union men on 
their beds in their tents or elsewhere. Indeed there was 
never any foundation for such stories except in the imagina- 
tion of sensational newspaper correspondents. And it is 
further to be stated that at the time when the lines came in 
collision at the front — about 8 o'clock — every regiment 
in the camp, three miles in extent, was in line waiting or- 
ders or was marching toward the sound of battle. 

A word of explanation should here be made in regard 
to General Sherman's (5th) division. This division was 
the first to go into camp at Pittsburg Landing, and the 
necessities of the situation required it to cover three im- 
portant approaches from the back country to the Landing; 
namely, the main Corinth road; a bridge on the Hamburg 
and Purdy road over Owl Creek; and a ford over Lick 
Creek near its mouth which accommodated travel from 
Hamburg both to Purdy and Savannah. The crossing of 
Owl Creek was about three miles west of the Landing, and 
the crossing of Lick Creek was about the same distance to 
the south of the Landing ; while the Corinth road ran south- 
west nearly midway between the two crossings. General 
Sherman camped three brigades (1st, 3d, and 4th) to occupy 
the Corinth road at Shiloh meeting-house, thus covering 
Owl Creek bridge. The other brigade (Stuart's) camping 



THE BATTLE OP SHILOH 39 

to cover Lick Creek crossing, was separated from the divi- 
sion by a little more tliau one mile, and it remained sepa- 
rated throughout the first day's battle, acting independently 
of the orders of the division commander. The space be- 
tween the two parts of Sherman's division was later occu- 
pied by General Prentiss's (6th) division formed of new 
regiments as they arrived. When reference is hereafter 
made to Sherman's division, in the action of Stmday, it is 
to be understood that Stuart's brigade is not included for 
the reasons explained. 

Still another explanation is needed. Wlien General Sher- 
man first went into camp special attention was paid to the 
selection of camping sites convenient to good water. By 
consulting the map it will be seen that three brigades of 
this division were camped somewhat irregularly, the left 
brigade being out of line with the other brigades and also 
-out of line in itself. As a consequence when line of battle 
was formed on Sunday morning it was not a prolonged 
line, the left of Hildebrand's brigade being well forward 
and in an open field where it was peculiarly exposed to the 
force of the first onset to which it quickly yielded as will 
1)6 seen. 

At a little after seven o'clock, and after line of battle 
had been formed, General Sherman and staff rode to the 
left of his division in Rhea Field for a better view to the 
front; and while there in front of the 53d Ohio regiment 
(Col. Appier) the Confederate skii-mishers opened fire from 
the brush across Sliiloh Branch, killing the general's or- 
derly. At about eight o'clock, looking off to the "left 
front", there were seen "the glistening bayonets of masses 
of infantry", and then, for the first time. General Sherman 
was convinced that "the enemy designed a determined 
attack."" A few minutes later the Confederate advance 

<' War of the Scbellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, Part I, p. 294. 



40 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 

struck Sherman's left under Colonel Hildebrand, and 
Prentiss's right under Colonel Peabody. How Prentiss's 
division met the attack has already been stated. How Sher- 
man's division met it will now be shown. 

The 53d Ohio, exposed as has been explained, and com- 
manded, unfortunately, by an officer whose nerve deserted 
him at the critical moment, after firing two volleys, became 
demoralized and as an organization disappeared, though 
two companies were rallied by their officers, joined other 
organizations and staid on the firing line throughout the 
day. Colonel Appier disappeared from the field and was 
later cashiered for cowardice. 

The attack on Sherman's left and center by Cleburne's 
brigade of Hardee's corps was furious and sustained — to- 
be repulsed, however, with heavy loss, by Buckland's brig- 
ade and the two remaining regiments of Hildebrand 's 
brigade. Cleburne, in his official report of this affair, says : 
"Everywhere his musketry and artillery at short range 
swept the open spaces .... with an iron storm that 
threatened certain destruction to every living thing that 

would dare to cross them Under the terrible fire much 

confusion followed, and a quick and bloody repulse was 
the consequence."*" 

One of Cleburne's regiments (6th Miss.) lost three hun- 
dred men, killed and wounded, out of 425, and his brigade- 
soon went to pieces. A second assault was made by Ander- 
son's brigade of Bragg 's corps to meet a similar repulse. A 
third assault was made by two brigades of Polk's corps 
(Russell's and Johnson's) joined with the reorganized brig- 
ades of Cleburne and Anderson and assisted by Wood on 
their right. This assault was successful, forcing Sherman 
from his first line at about ten o'clock, and with him one 
brigade of McClernand's division that had come to his sup- 

48 War of the Eehellion: Oficial Records. Series I, Vol. X, Part I, p. 581. 



THE BATTLE OP SHILOH 41 

port on tbe left. Sherman's right brigade (McDowell's) was 
not involved in this engagement for the reason that the line 
of attack crossed its front diagonally without bringing it 
into action; but a little later Pond's brigade, from the ex- 
treme left of Bragg 's corps, appeared in McDowell's front, 
overlapping his right and covering Owl Creek bridge. Or- 
ders were then given to fall back to the Purdy road, and Mc- 
Dowell's camp was abandoned without a fight. By this 
time Hildebrand's brigade had gone to pieces and Hilde- 
brand himself being without a command, reported to Gen- 
eral McClernand for staff duty. In fact this first assault 
on Sherman's line fell mainly upon a single brigade (Buck- 
land's), and it was on the hillside in his front where, accord- 
ing to General Lew. Wallace, there was "a pavement of 
dead men", after the fight was over. This must be con- 
sidered one of the conspicuous features of Sunday's bat- 
tle. Time was of the utmost importance, to enable the 
proper formations in distant parts of the camp. The need- 
ed time was secured by the stubborn fight made by Sher- 
man's division on its first line; and it was probably this 
that gained for General Sherman, in the minds of some, 
credit for saving the day. 

It was in the Confederate plan to push its right east to 
the river, turn the Union left, seize the Landing, and force 
the army back on Owl Creek where it was expected sur- 
render would necessarily follow. The stubbornness of the 
resistance to the Confederate left delayed the movement 
toward the river somewhat, though two brigades (Chal- 
mers's and Jackson's) were in fi'ont of the Union left near 
the mouth of Lick Creek, very soon after the extreme right 
fell back from the first line. To meet these two brigades 
of nine regiments and two batteries. Colonel Stuart had a 
single brigade of three regiments without artillery — and 
one of these regiments (71st Ohio) was led off the field by 



42 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 

its colonel soon after the fight began to take no further 
part in the day's battle. Colonel Mason was later cash- 
iered for his conduct at Shiloh. 

The two remaining regiments of this brigade gave a. 
good account of themselves (54th Illinois and 55th Ohio),, 
making heroic resistance and suffering severely in casual- 
ties. There are those who believe that the fighting on the ex- 
treme left by this little band of about eight hundred men 
without artillery and against three or four times their num- 
ber with artillery was not less important than was the 
fighting on the extreme right, though less conspicuous. This, 
movement of the Confederate right was under the personal 
direction of General Johnston, and upon its quick success 
depended the success of the battle as planned. Before 
eleven o'clock the battle was raging from right to left, a 
distance of three to four miles. 

As has been already stated, by the time that the battle 
was fairly on at the front every regiment in the most dis- 
tant parts of the camp was in line. McClernand promptly" 
supported Sherman, and Hurlbut also sent one of his brig- 
ades (Veach's) to that part of the field, leading his two- 
remaining brigades to support Prentiss. Hurlbut, meeting 
Prentiss's division falling back in disorder, allowed the men 
to drift through his ranks, then formed line at the Peach 
Orchard, facing Lamnan's brigade west and William's 
brigade south, where he met first the attack of Chalmers's 
and Jackson's brigades from the direction of Prentiss's 
abandoned camp. A little later this position was attacked 
by the brigades of Bowen, Statham, Stephens, and Glad- 
den — the latter officer, however, having received a mortal 
wound in front of Prentiss's first line, as already stated. 

C. F. Smith's (2nd) division, now commanded by W. H. 
L. Wallace, camped near the Landing and fully three miles 
from the point where the battle began, was in line by eight 



THE BATTLE OF SHILOU 43 

o'clock, and the first brigade of four regiments (Colonel 
Tuttle) advanced to Duncan Field and took position in the 
"sunken road" — long abandoned as useless, but which ere 
nightfall was destined to become famous for desperate fight- 
ing against odds. (Map III.) Of the second brigade (Gen- 
eral McArthur's) one regiment was sent to the right; two 
were sent to cover Snake Creek bridge, over which General 
Lew. Wallace's division was expected at an early hour; 
and two marched under General Mc Arthur himself, to the 
support of Stuart, on the extreme left. The third brigade 
(Sweeny's) moved south on the Corinth road to act as a 
reserve, though it was not permitted to wait upon oppor- 
tunity. Two regiments of this brigade (7th and 58th Illi- 
nois) were sent at once to the right to prolong Tuttle 's 
line to connect with McClernand, going into position at 
about nine-thirty o'clock. A third regiment (50th Illinois) 
was sent to McArthur on the left; and the remaining regi- 
ment of the brigade (8th Iowa), between eleven and twelve 
o'clock, took position at Tuttle 's left in the "sunken road" 
connecting its left with Prentiss who, having rallied a part 
of his division, put them in at the right of Hurlbut. Pren- 
tiss was here joined under fire by the 23d Missouri, just 
landed from the boats, giving him about one thousand men 
in the "Hornets' Nest". Two other regiments (15th and 
16th Iowa), assigned to Prentiss's division, landing too late 
to join him at his camp, were sent to McClernand, joining 
him at Jones's Field, one and a half miles west of the Land- 
ing. 

Before noon the contending armies were in continuous 
and compact line from flank to flank. Welded in the fur- 
nace heat of four hours' battle witliout a moment's respite, 
it might be said with little exaggeration that the men stood 
foot to foot, contending for the mastery. The Union lines 
had steadily but slowly receded, shortening at the flanks. 



44 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 

and the Confederates had as steadily advanced, extending 
their flanks but recoiling again and again from attacks 
made at the center, and with heavy loss. 

The Confederate reserve under General Breckenridge, 
about 8,500 men, were all in action before noon, the first 
brigade (Trabue) going in on their extreme left at about 
the time that Sherman fell back from his first line. The 
other two brigades (Bowen and Statham) went into line 
on the right south of the Peach Orchard, between eleven 
and twelve o'clock in front of Hurlbut and near where Gen- 
eral Johnston had his headquarters in the saddle. Though 
General Johnston personally directed the battle on the 
Confederate side, in this part of the field, he did not, as 
some writers have told the story, personally encourage an 
unwilling Tennessee regiment by riding along the line and 
tapping the bayonets of the men with a tin cup which he 
carried in his hand, then leading the line in a furious 
charge. No part of such an incident occurred there or 
elsewhere, on the authority of one of General Johnston's 
chief Aids, Governor Harris of Tennessee — the only per- 
son who was present at the death of General Johnston soon 
after and near the spot where the incident is said to have 
occurred. 

Stuart, McArthur, and Hurlbut having successfully re- 
jiulsed several attacks, General Johnston was evidently 
convinced that the Union left was not to be easily turned ; 
and so about noon under his personal direction, having put 
into his lines two brigades of the reserve under General 
Breckenridge, a forward movement was ordei*ed, six brig- 
ades participating — Chalmers's, Jackson's, Bowen 's, Stat- 
ham's, Stephens's, and Gladden's. Threatened on his left 
by a cavalry flanking movement, Stuart was the first to 
slowly give ground; McArthur, on Stuart's right, neces- 
sarily followed, both changing front from south to south- 



THE BATTLE OF SIIILOII 



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THE BATTLE OP SHILOH 53 

east, falling back and fighting for every foot of ground. 
This movement compelled Hurlbut to retire from his first 
position to the north side of the Peach Orchard (Map IV). 
At about two o'clock, Colonel Stuart having been wounded, 
his two regiments having lost heavily, and having exhausted 
their ammunition — even after robbing the cartridge-boxes 
of their dead and wounded comrades — retired toward the 
Landing. General McArthur followed not long after; and 
General Hurlbut, having connected his right with General 
Prentiss's left, swung back until their lines were nearly at 
right angles. (Map V.) Hurlbut retired toward the Land- 
ing at about four or four-thirty o'clock, leaving the line 
from left to right in the following order: Prentiss's com- 
mand, 8th Iowa of Sweeny's brigade, Tuttle's full brigade, 
and the 58th Illinois of Sweeny's brigade. 

While this fierce struggle was in progress on the Con- 
federate right, at about two-thirty afternoon, General John- 
ston received the wound from which he died a few minutes 
later. General Bragg then took command of the right, and 
General Ruggles succeeded Bragg in the center. 

While the battle raged on the Union left, as described, it 
was not less stubborn and bloody on the right; but Sher- 
man and McClernand were forced back to the Hamburg 
and Savannah road — a mile from the Landing — about 
four-thirty o'clock, the Confederates gradually closing in 
from both flanks around the center. (Map VI.) Meantime 
General W. H. L. Wallace had sent orders for his command 
to retire; but for some reason never explained four of his 
six regiments did not receive the order and were captured, 
as will be explained. As General Wallace and General Tut- 
tle, followed by the 2nd and 7th Iowa Regiments, were fight- 
ing their way through a severe crossfire at short range, 
General Wallace was mortally wounded, and was left on the 



54 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 

field to be recovered the next day, dying three or four days 
later without recovering consciousness. 

THE hornets' nest 

This appellation owes its origin to the men who felt the 
sting of the hornets. William Preston Johnston in his 
history of his father (General A. S. Johnston) speaks of 
the term as a "mild metaphor", and says that "no figure 
of speech would be too strong to express the deadly peril 
of an assault upon this natural fortress whose inaccessible 
barriers blazed for six hours with sheets of flame, and whose 
infernal gates poured forth a murderous storm of shot and 
shell and musket-fire which no living thing could quell or 
withstand"." 

No more graphic description of the fight at the Hornets' 
Nest has been written than that of which the language 
quoted is a part — written from the view-point of the at- 
tacking forces, and, therefore, written with full knowledge 
of the results that followed from the "murderous storm of 
shot and shell and musket-fire." ^It is literally true that 
Duncan Field and the woods and thickets bordering it 
along the "sunken road" were thickly strewn with the dead 
and wounded. The same author tells us that "Hind- 
man's brilliant brigades .... were shivered into fragments 
and paralyzed"; that "Stewart's regiments .... retired 
mangled from the field"; that "Gibson's splendid brigade 
.... recoiled and fell back" — four several times, indeed. 
Colonel Gibson, in his official report says of his brigade: 
"Four times the position was charged and four times the 
assault proved unavailing." 

The best informed writer, living or dead, on the details 
and incidents of the Battle of Shiloh — Major D. W. Reed, 
Secretary and Historian of the Shiloh National Military 

*3 Johnston's Life of General A. S. Johnston, p. 620. 



THE BATTLE OP SHILOH 55 

Park Commission and author of Campaigns and Battles 
Twelfth Regiment Iowa Veteran Volunteer Infantry, who 
was himself in the Nest during the entire day, says there 
were "twelve separate and distinct charges" made upon the 
line at the Hornets' Nest, with the result that three Confed- 
erate brigades were" entirely disorganized", and that "thir- 
teen regiments lost their regimental organizations .... and 
were not brought into the fight again .... during the day."^" 
General Euggles, who commanded the Confederate lines in 
that part of the field after the death of General Johnston, 
designates this as "one of the controlling conflicts of that 
eventful day." '' The position was of such conspicuous im- 
portance that a brief description of the ground will not be 
out of place. 

Moving out on the Corinth road from the Landing about 
three-fourths of a mile one crosses the Hamburg and 
Savannah road. A fourth of a mile further on the road 
forks, the left hand branch (Eastern Corinth) bearing south 
of southwest; and one-fourth of a mile still further on it 
crosses an old abandoned road near the southeast corner of 
Duncan Field, and near the center of the Hornets' Nest. 
The right-hand road from the fork runs nearly west, cross- 
ing the north end of Duncan Field, then bearing south 
passes the ' ' Little Log Meeting-house ' '. At the point where 
this road, going from the Landing, strikes the east line of 
Duncan Field the abandoned road leads off to the south- 
east about a half-mile, then bending east to the Hamburg 
and Savannah road near Bloody Pond — another signifi- 
cant local name. Along this abandoned road, beginning 
near the north end of Duncan Field, the line of battle from 
right to left, was as follows: 58th Illinois (Sweeny's brig- 

»o Rpcd 's Campaigns and Battles of the Twelfth Begiment Iowa Veteran Vol- 
unteer Infantry, p. 50. 

»i War of the Bebellion: Official Becords, Series I, Vol. X, Part I, p. 475. 



56 THE BATTLE OP SHILOH 

ade) ; second, seventh, twelfth, and fourteentli Iowa regi- 
ments (Tuttle's brigade) ; to the left of this brigade was 
the eighth Iowa, of Sweeny's brigade; to the left still was 
Prentiss's division, consisting of one entire regiment (23d 
Missouri), and parts of several other regiments — the en- 
tire line nmnbering not to exceed 2,500 men. The old road 
ran along a slight elevation and was so water-washed in 
places as to afford good shelter to men lying down to fire 
on an advancing enemy — a sort of natural rifle-pit, though 
rather shallow in places. About half of the distance, from 
right to left, there was open field extending to the front 
about 500 yards to the timber occupied by the Confederates. 
The left half of the line was well screened by timber and, 
for the most part, by a heavy growth of underbrush so that 
the advancing lines not able to see the men lying in the old 
road were received with a crushing fire at short range. In 
every instance the repulse was complete and bloody. 

General Ruggles, becoming convinced that the position 
could not be taken by infantry, from the front, determined 
to concentrate his artillery and bombard the strong-hold. 
He tells us in his official report '- that he directed his staff 
officers "to bring forward all the field guns they could col- 
lect from the left toward the right". General Ruggles 
evidently believed that this was a crisis in the battle, admit- 
ting that "for a brief period the enemy apparently gained". 
Nor was he alone in tlie belief, for one of his artillery of- 
ficers (Captain Sandidge) said officially: "I have no doubt 
that had they been seasonably reinforced when they checked 
our advancing troops, they could certainly have broken our 
lines". And he feared that result before the guns could 
be planted and infantry supports brought up. General Rug- 
gles succeeded in bringing up sixty-two guns from the left, 

52 War of the Rebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, Part I, p. 472. 



THE BATTLE OP SHILOH 57 

which were planted on the west side of Duncan Field about 
five liundred yards away; and the bombardment began at 
about four-thirty afternoon. Of course there could be but 
one result. The Union batteries were forced to retire, leav- 
ing the way clear for the encircling Confederate lines to 
close in. Besides the Ruggles aggregation of artillery of 
sixty-two guns, there must have been several other batter- 
ies playing upon the Hornets' Nest from the right, as none 
of the guns from that part of the field were in the Ruggles 
aggregation. Probably not less than seventy-five guna 
were trained on that devoted spot, and fully three-fourths 
of the Confederate army was coiling around it. And for 
some time before the surrender took place, a few minutes 
before six o'clock, rifle-fire poured in from three directions, 
as the beleagured faced about and attempted to fight their 
way out. The number to surrender was about 2,000 men. 
The importance of tliis prolonged contest, from a little be- 
fore ten forenoon to nearly six afternoon, upon the des- 
tinies of the day can hardly be estimated. It secured to 
General Grant's army the thing most needed — time to form 
the new line; time for Lew. Wallace, for Buell, and for 
Night to come. The Hornets' Nest was distinctly an altar 
of sacrifice. (Map VI.) 

HOW BUELL SAVED THE DAY 

By the time the Confederate oflBcers had recovered from 
their "surprise" at the smallness of the capture at the 
Hornets' Nest, in view of the prolonged and effective resist- 
ance encountered. General Grant had formed his new line 
on the north side of Dill Branch, running from the mouth 
of the Branch on a curve back to the road leading from the 
Landing; thence west to the Hamburg and Savannah road; 
thence north to the swamp bordering Snake Creek. At the 
extreme left of the line, the two gunboats lay opposite the 



58 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 

mouth of the Branch. On the bluffs near the mouth of the 
Branch were two batteries, trained up-stream. Two other 
batteries were a little farther from the river and back 
nearer the road leading from the Landing; and two more 
were still farther west, but advanced toward the edge of 
the bluffs overlooking the Branch. Back on the road again 
and a little west were two more batteries before coming to 
the six big siege guns. 

A glance at the map for Sunday night's position will 
show that the line from the mouth of Dill Branch west to 
the siege guns was a semi-circle with the gunboats at the 
extreme left, and that there were about fifty guns in the 
line east of the Hamburg and Savannah road, exclusive of 
the gunboats. Behind this array of artillery was ample 
infantry support, except on the extreme left where support 
was not needed, because of the nature of the ground in 
front. As General Nelson marched the head of his column 
up from the Landing at about five-thirty o'clock, he noted 
the absence of infantry along that part of the line, and in 
his official report he describes what he saw as a "semicircle 
of artillery, totally unsupported by infantry", which was 
not quite true; and he added another statement which was 
not at all true, namely; "the left of the artillery was com- 
pletely turned by the enemy and the gunners fled from their 
pieces." ^^ General Nelson evidently knew nothing of the 
batteries near the mouth of Dill Branch, for he struck the 
line at about the middle of the "semicircle" and the single 
regiment that he brought into action (36th Indiana) was 
sent to support the guns in front of the main line toward 
Dill Branch. 

Opposed to this array of Union artillery a single Confed- 
erate battery took part in the last attack, and that was dis- 
abled. 

=3 Var of the Sebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, Part I, p. 323. 



THE BATTLE OP SHILOH 59 

Any fair-minded person, having knowledge of the char- 
acter of the ground between the lines of the two armies as 
the lines were on Sunday night — especially on the left of 
the Union lines — must admit that Grant's was a strong 
position and that his antagonist had serious obstacles to 
overcome before he could strike with effect. 

With as little delay as possible after the surrender at 
the Hornets' Nest, General Bragg, still commanding the 
Confederate right, ordered his division commanders to 
"drive the enemy into the river", believing, doubtless, that 
the "drive" would be a brief and easy task. Accordingly 
the Confederate right uncoiled itself from around the Hor- 
nets' Nest and, led by Chalmers's and Jackson's brigades of 
Withers 's division, advanced along the road toward the 
Landing; then, filing right, formed line on the south side 
of Dill Branch and near the margin of the deep ravine. 
This ravine, impassable at its mouth by reason of steep 
bluffs and back-water, was difficult to pass fully a half-mile 
from its mouth. Its steep sides were timbered and ob- 
structed by underbrush, and at the bottom it was fairly 
choked with undergrowth. 

The last attack made upon the Union lines was upon the 
extreme left in which only two small brigades and one bat- 
tery participated. Chalmers's brigade had nominally five 
regiments, but one of the regiments (52nd Tennessee) 
"acted badly" in the early part of the day, and three hun- 
dred of its four hundred men are not to be counted. Jack- 
son's brigade detached one regiment to guard the Hornets' 
Nest prisoners, so that it seems to be liberal, allowing for 
the losses of the day, to say that there were not to exceed 
1800 men engaged in the last assault. 

The two brigades made their way down the southern 
slope, through the tangled undergrowth at the bottom of 
the ravine and, quoting from their official reports, "strug- 



60 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 

gled" up the other slope, "which was very steep" encoun- 
tering in "attempting to mount the last ridge" the "fire 
from a whole line of batteries protected by infantry and 
assisted by shells from the gunboats." General Chalmers 
says his men "were too much exhausted to storm the bat- 
teries".''* 

General Jackson says his men were without ammunition, 
having "only their bayonets to rely on", and that when 
they "arrived near the crest of the opposite hill", they 
"could not be urged farther without support", the men 
"sheltering themselves against the precipitous sides of the 
ravine" where "they remained under fire for some time." ^^ 
(The Confederate skirmish line is shown on Map VI, at the 
crest of the bluff, north of Dill Branch.) 

This was the situation when eight companies of the 36th 
Indiana (Colonel Grose), about four hundred men, of Am- 
men's brigade. Nelson's division. Army of the Ohio, arrived 
on the scene. Colonel Grose was ordered to go to the sup- 
port of Stone's battery, which was in position some distance 
in advance of Grant's main line and near the brow of the 
hill up which the assailants were climbing with great diffi- 
culty. There the 36th Indiana exchanged shots with the 
skirmishers of Chalmers's brigade, during fifteen to thirty 
minutes ^^ having one man killed and one man wounded. In 
his history of the 36th Indiana, Colonel Grose says that 
"after three or four rounds the enemy fell back. It was 
then dark." And he says, further, that "no part of Buell's 
army, except the Thirty-sixth Indiana, took any part what- 
ever in the Sunday evening fight at Shiloh." And he might 
have said with equal truth and without disparagement to 
his regiment that the presence of the Thirty-sixth Indiana 

51 War of the Bebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, Part I, pp. 550-551. 

55 War of the EebelUon: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, Part I, p. 555. 

56 War of the RebeUion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, Part I, p. 334. 



THE BATTLE OP SHILOH 61 

had no effect in determining the issues of the day. Had the 
four hundred men not been there the "enemy" would have 
retired just the same, for he could never have crossed the 
open space from the "last ridge" to the "line of batteries". 
The ground to be traversed was but gently rolling with lit- 
tle to obstruct the view — no sheltering ridge or friendly 
copse to admit of unobserved approach. It must have been 
a "rush" of two to four hundred yards, in the face of point- 
blank firing, to reach the batteries, behind which, as already 
stated, was ample infantry support. The battle of the day 
really came to an end at the Hornets' Nest. All that fol- 
lowed was mere skirmishing for the purpose of developing 
the new conditions. 

THE LOST OPPORTUNITY 

The "Lost Opportunity" is a phrase of Confederate 
origin and it refers to the last moments of Sunday's battle, 
briefly described above. Both the idea and the phrase seem 
to have been born of an afterthought, and a disposition to 
shift blame to the shoulders of General Beauregard, should 
blame be imputed, for failure to crush or capture Grant's 
army. The claim has been put forward with considerable 
persistency that the order of General Beauregard to with- 
draw from the contest was responsible for the escape of 
Grant's army. This absurd claim has been answered most 
effectively by General Thomas Jordan, Adjutant-General 
of the Confederate forces engaged at Shiloh. 

In Southern Historical Society Papers,'''' General Jordan 
takes up the subject and refers to the official reports of 
several division, brigade, and regimental commanders for 
the purpose of showing the demoralized and exhausted con- 
dition of the Confederate army. In referring to the report 
of General AVithers, two brigades of whose division made 

07 Southern Historical Society Papers, Vol. XVI, p. 297. 



62 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 

the last feeble assault, he says: "If there be significance 
in words, he makes it clear that such was the absolute late- 
ness of the hour, that had the attempt been made to carry 
the Federal batteries .... with such troops as were there 
assembled, it would have resulted in an awful butchery and 
dispersion of all employed in so insensate, so preposterous 
an undertaking; and such must be the verdict of any mili- 
tary man who may studiously read the reports of the sub- 
ordinate ofiScers of Withers 's three brigades, and bear in 
mind the formidable line of fifty-odd pieces of artillery 
which Webster had improvised".^* 

Surgeon J. C. Nott of General Bragg 's staff, who rode 
by his chief's side nearly all day, is quoted as saying that 
the "men .... were too much demoralized and indisposed 
to advance in the face of the shells .... bursting over us 
in every direction, and my impression was .... that our 
troops had done all that they would do, and had better be- 
withdrawn." ^® 

Another officer of General Bragg 's staff. Colonel Urqu- 
hart, writing in 1880 is quoted thus: "The plain truth 
must be told, that our troops at the front were a thin line 
of exhausted men, who were making no further headway. 
.... Several years of subsequent service have impressed 
me that General Beauregard's order for withdrawing the 
troops was most timely".®" 

The claim that there was a "Lost Opportunity" because 
of the order to retire. General Jordan says, "becomes sim- 
ply shameful, under the light of the closely contempora- 
neous statements of every division commander, except one 
(Withers) ; of all the brigade and regimental commanders 
of each Confederate corps, including the reserve whose re- 

^» Southern Historical Society Papers, Vol. XVI, pp. 300, 301. 
sc Southern Historical Society Papers, Vol. XVI, p. 307. 
60 Southern Historical Society Papers, Vol. XVI, p. 316. 



THE BATTLE OP SHILOH 63 

ports have reached the light ; that is, of nearly all command- 
ers present in the battle.""' 

This ought to be sufScient evidence to settle forever both 
propositions in the negative; namely, the claim that Buell 
"saved the day", and that there was a "Lost Opportunity". 

The condition of Grant's army at the close of Sunday's 
battle as to strength has been greatly underrated by certain 
writers, and its disorganization has been greatly exagger- 
ated by writers who have had an object in so representing it. 
It is true that both armies were badly battered as the result 
of about fourteen hours' continuous fighting with scarcely a 
moment's cessation. Careful study of the reports of Con- 
federate officers shows that there was not a single point of 
attack on any part of the field at any hour of the day where 
there was not stubborn resistance with serious loss to the 
attacking forces. These reports also show that there was 
serious defection from their ranks, beginning early and 
continuing during the day, and that when night came on 
there was such disorganization that some of their command- 
ers were entirely separated from their commands and re- 
mained so separated to the close of the battle, Monday 
night. These reports further show that instead of bivouack- 
ing in line of battle as did Grant's army the entire Confed- 
erate army, with the exception of a single brigade (Pond's 
brigade on the extreme left) withdrew a distance of two to 
four miles from the Landing. It is in evidence also from 
the same sources of information that General Beauregard 
was able to put in line on the morning of the second day 
substantially half the number of men that were in line on 
the morning of the first day. General Grant was able to 
put in line about the same proportion, exclusive of the re- 
enforcements that came up during the night. 

There are no means of determining the comparative 

•J Southern Historical Society Papers, Vol. XVI, pp. 316-317. 



64 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 

casualties in the two armies on the first day, but there is no 
reason for doubting that they were substantially equal — 
exclusive of the capture at the Hornets' Nest. It is known, 
however, that the casualties among field officers, from the 
grade of colonel upward, were greater in the Union than in 
the Confederate army in Sunday's battle. 

Much has been said about the "stragglers" from the 
Union lines crowding the Landing and "cowering" under 
the river bluffs — and with about the same degree of exag- 
geration as certain writers have indulged in their descrip- 
tions of the opening of the battle. There were ' ' stragglers ' ' 
from both armies, and there is no reason to doubt that the 
nmnbers were substantially equal. It is true, however, that 
the straggling was more in evidence on the Union side, for 
the very good reason that it was more concentrated — con- 
fined to a limited area about the Landing — while on the 
other side there was unlimited room for expansion and 
scattering over miles of territory. This remark applies 
with equal force to other features of the crowded condition 
near the Landing, late in the day. Hundreds of teamsters 
with their four-mule and six-mule teams were there because 
it was the only place of safety for one of the essential parts 
of the army's equipment; the sick from the regimental hos- 
pitals and company tents were there — several hundred of 
them — because there was no other place to go ; and hun- 
dreds of wounded were there from the front, together with 
a force of hospital attendants. Add these together and you 
have several thousand without counting a single "strag- 
gler". These things are never considered by critics who 
have a cause to support. Every large army requires a 
small army to care for it, who are, necessarily, noncom- 
batants. 



THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 65 

BtJELL COMES ON THE FIELD 

By General Orders of March 31st, General Grant's head- 
quarters were transferred from Savannah to Pittsburg 
Landing; but a headquarters' office was continued at the 
former place for convenience up to the day of the battle, 
and General Grant passed between the two places every day, 
or nearly every day, on the headquarters' boat, Tigress. 
On Sunday morning, at Savannah, an "early breakfast" 
had been ordered, as it was General Grant's purpose to 
ride out with his staff to meet General Buell, whose arrival 
the evening before was not known. While at breakfast, 
firing was heard in the direction of Pittsburg Landing — 
"the breakfast was left unfinished" and General Grant 
and staff went directly to the boat and steamed rapidly up 
the river, stopping at Crump's Landing to order General 
Lew. Wallace to hold his division in readiness for marching 
orders. 

Before leaving Savannah General Grant sent to General 
Nelson of Buell's army, the following order: "An attack 
having been made on our forces, you will move your entire 
command to the river opposite Pittsburg".''- A similar 
order was sent to General Wood, commanding another 
division of Buell's army, not yet arrived at Savannah, to 
move "with the utmost dispatch to the river" at Savannah, 
where boats would meet him. The following note was left 
for General Buell whose presence in Savannah was not 
known to General Grant: 

Savannah, April 6, 1862 
General D. C. Buell: 

Heavy firing is heard up the river, indicating plainly that 
an attack has beon mado on our most advanced positions. I have 
been looking for tbis. but did not believe that the attack could be 
made before Monday or Tuesday. This necessitates my joining the 

02 IVar of the SeheUion: Official Becords, Series I, Vol. X, Part II, p. 95. 



66 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 

forces up the river instead of meeting you today, as I had contem- 
plated. I have directed General Nelson to move to the river with 
his division. He can march to opposite Pittsburg. 
Respectfully, your obedient servant, 

U. S. Grant 
Major-General Commauding.*^ 

This note clearly shows that General Grant, in common 
with his division commanders, was expecting an early 
attack. 

As soon as General Grant, after arriving on the iSeld, 
learned the true situation, he sent a staff officer with an- 
other order to General Nelson : *'.... you will hurry up 
your command as fast as possible. All looks well but it is 
necessary for you to push forward as fast as possible"."* 
liater still, probably about noon though it may have been 
later, nothing having been heard either from Buell or Nel- 
son, General Grant sent another hurry-up order addressed 
to the "Commanding Officer Advance Forces ( Buell 's 
Army)". This order was delivered to General Buell on 
the boat as he was going to the Landing. He arrived at 
the Landing, he tells us in Shiloh Reviewed, about 1 o'clock, 
though Villard, who claims to have been on the same boat, 
makes the time later, between 5 and 6 o'clock, about the 
time that Nelson's advance crossed the river. And there 
are certain features of Buell 's official report which, in the 
absence of a definite statement on the point, make Villard 's 
claim as to the hour at least plausible. 

General Grant's first order to General Nelson must have 
been received as early at 7 o 'clock — probably earlier, for 
Nelson had the order when General Buell, after hearing 
the firing, went to General Grant's hadquarters for infor- 
mation, where he learned that the latter had "just started 
for the Landing"."' 

03 War of the Eebellion: Official Records, Vol. LII, Part I, p. 232. 

6-1 War of the Bebellion: Official Becords, Vol X, Part II, pp. 95-96. 

66 War of the Bebellion: Official Becords, Series I, Vol. X, Part I, p. 292. 



THE BATTLE OP SHILOH 67 

General Nelson in bis ofiScial report does not state the 
Lour of receiving the order to march, but says that be "left 
Savannah, by order of General Grant, reiterated by General 
Buell in person, at 1.30 p. m. '"'''■ The language is a little 
ambiguous, but it doubtless means that the order was "re- 
iterated" about noou or later and that the march began at 
one-thirty, afternoon.*^" (Colonel Ammen says at one, 
afternoon.) 

Villard, heretofore quoted, says that Nelson received 
Grant's order about noon, by which he probably means the 
"reiterated" order. In any event it appears that General 
Buell "held up" the order to Nelson fully five hours and 
then "reiterated" it. Why did General Buell do that? 
Why did General Nelson wait to have the order "reiterat- 
ed"? Why did he not obey the original order regardless of 
any dilatory order from General Buell, since the contin- 
gency had arisen under which by General Halleck's instruc- 
tions General Grant was "authorized to take the general 
command" of both armies; namely, an attack upon his own 
army? Had General Nelson marched under the original 
order, his division would have been on the field at about 
the time that it started on the ten-mile march. What might 
have been the effect of throwing 4,500 fresh men in the 
scale of battle, then hanging in doubtful poise, is, of course, 
conjectural — and it must be left to conjecture, though 
there is little room for doubt. 

General Nelson's entire division was across the river soon 
after dark. Advancing a little to the front on the extreme 
left it bivouacked for the night. A little later General Lew. 
Wallace came up on the extreme right, his division number- 
ing about 5,000 men ; but having to counter-march the divi- 
sion in order to bring the regiments in proper position his 

«« ffar of ihe Sebcllion: Offlcial Records, Series I, Vol. X, Part I, p. 323. 
•I War of the Ecbellion: Official Secords, Series I, Vol. X, Part I, p. 323. 



68 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 

formation was not completed imtil after midnight when it 
went into bivouac. 

During Sunday night Crittenden's division of Buell's 
army (two brigades) came up by boat, and in the morning 
two brigades of McCook's division arrived, to be joined 
about noon by another brigade. Wood's division, which 
was about thirty miles away when the battle began, arrived 
on the field at about two afternoon Monday, when the battle 
was about over. The total additions to the Union lines up 
to noon on Monday was approximately 20,000 men. 

During Sunday's battle General Grant passed from point 
to point behind the firing line, meeting and consulting with 
his division commanders and carefully observing the move- 
ments of the contending forces, for, as has already been 
stated, there was no point on the field from which general 
observations could be made. On Monday he commanded his 
own army, giving no orders to General Buell, the latter 
exercising independent command. Why General Grant did 
not assume "general command" of both armies we might 
fairly conjecture (if conjecture were necessary) to be due 
to the attitude of General Buell toward Grant's order to 
Nelson on Sunday morning — treating it as invalid until 
"reiterated" by himself. There is no room for conjecture 
in the matter, however, for General Buell says in his Shiloh 
Reviewed^^: "I did not look upon him [Grant] as my 
commander". There is evidence also that Buell was dis- 
posed to treat the subject of Sunday's battle as something 
of a sham — that the resistance to the Confederate attacks 
was not particularly strenuous. General Tuttle of Grant's 
army, acted on Monday as reserve to General Buell, having 
under his command the two Iowa Regiments that cut their 
way out of the Hornets' Nest on Sunday, and one or two 
other regiments of Grant's army. General Tuttle relates 

68 The Century Maga:ine, Vol. XXXI, p. 771. 



THE BATTLE OP SHILOH 69 

that "while passing over the field, April 7th", following up 
the advancing lines, "General Buell taunted me with not 
having done any fighting that amounted to anything [on 
Sunday]." When they came to the "clearing" in front 
of the Hornets' Nest and saw the ground strewn with dead, 
Buell "was compelled to confess that there must have been 
terrible fighting". Had General Buell passed over the 
ground at the Peach Orchard and over the slope in front 
of Sherman's first line, he would have found similar con- 
ditions to those in the "clearing" in front of the Hornets' 
Nest. His estimate of the vigor of the Confederate attacks 
on Sunday was probably based upon the feeble attack made 
by exhausted men which he himself saw near the Landing 
on Simday night. 

In Monday's battle General Buell 's army constituted the 
left and General Grant's the right, with General Lew. Wal- 
lace's fresh division occupying the extreme right of the 
line — and it is worth mentioning here that at least two of 
Grant's regiments were sent before the battle was over to 
the extreme left, and one of them, under command of Gen- 
eral Nelson, made a bayonet charge across an open field. 
Another of Grant's regiments, under Crittenden and near 
the center, charged and captured a battery. In neither 
case was it necessary for General Grant to "reiterate" 
the requisite orders. 

As to the outcome of the contest on Monday there could 
be no doubt, with the large accession to the ranks of the 
Union army — a force nearly equal to the number of men 
that the Confederates were able to put in line. General 
Grant had instructed his division commanders on Sunday 
night to be ready to attack early in the morning, and Gen- 
eral Buell ordered his divisions "to move forward as soon 
as it was light". Artillery fire began nearly at the same 
time — about five-thirty — on the extreme flanks of the Un- 



70 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 

ion army, though the lines were not in contact until about 
eight o'clock. It would not be correct to characterize the 
movements of the Union lines on Monday as General Beau- 
regard characterized the movements of the Confederate 
lines on Sunday — the figui-e of the ' ' Alpine avalanche ' ' 
would not apply to the movements of either day. However, 
the Union lines moved forward without serious repulses at 
any point, though there were some reverses on the left. The 
Confederates held their ground with stubbornness, oc- 
cupying the line of the Purdy road until about noon. By two 
o'clock the battle was practically over, and an hour later the 
Confederates were in full retreat. Map No. VII will give a 
good idea of the general movements, on Monday. There was 
no general pursuit of the defeated army — just enough to be 
sure that it was a retreat in fact. The lack of pusuit was 
not, however, because Grant lacked "the energy to order a 
pursuit", as John Codman Roi^es alleges, but because Hal- 
leck's instructions did not permit pursuit;"* hands were 
still "tied". 

NUMBERS ENGAGED AND LOSSES 

There are two methods of estimating the strength of an 
army — one method excludes all noncombatants, the other 
includes noncombatants as essential parts of the army. On 
the inclusive method, the Historian and Secretary of the 
Shiloh National Military Park Commission ''" gives the 
strength of Grant's five divisions on Sunday at 39,830, and 
that of Johnston's army at 43,968."^ In a note "^ in which 
he excludes noncombatants, the estimate is 33,000 and 40,000 
respectively. The figures last given correspond with the 

09 War of the Rebellion: Offieial Records, Series I, Vol. X, Part II, pp. 97, 
104. 

TO Eeed 's The Battle of Shiloh, p. 98. 
'1 Reed's The Battle of Shiloh, p. 110. 
72 Reed's The Battle of Shiloh, p. 112. 



THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 71 

estimates of the two commanders — Grant in his Memoirs, 
and Johnston in his dispatch from Corinth, when about to 
march. In artillery, Johnston had one hundred and twenty- 
eight guns and Grant one hundred and twelve. Had Wal- 
lace's division come upon the field early on Sunday the two 
armies would have been very evenly matched, both in men 
and guns. On the second day, including noncombatants and 
"stragglers", the figures given are: Union, 54,592; Con- 
federate, 34,000.'^^ The complete and accurate losses of the 
respective armies for the respective days have never been, 
and cannot be, stated. The losses of Grant's army by divi- 
sions, two days (except 3d di\'ision one day) were as fol- 
lows: 

Killed Wounded Prisoners Total 

1st division, McClernand 285 1,372 85 1,742 

2nd " W. H. L. Wallace . . .270 1,173 1,306 2,749 

3d " Lew. Wallace 41 251 4 296 

4th " Hurlbut 317 1,441 111 1,869 

5th " Sherman 325 1,277 299 1,901 

6th " Prentiss 236 928 1,008 2,172 

Unassigned 39 159 17 215 

Total Army Tenn 1,513 6,601 2,830 10,944'* 

Army of the Ohio, Monday — '' 

2nd division 88 823 7 918 

4th " 93 603 20 716 

5th " 60 377 28 465 

6th " 4 .. 4 

Total 241 1,807 55 2,103 

Grand total 1,754 8,408 2,885 13,047 

Armyof Miss. (Confederate) ...1,728 8,012 959 10,699'« 

13 Rood '8 The Battle of Shiloh, p. 110. 

"Reed's The Battle of Shiloh, p. 98. 

"Reed's The Battle of Shiloh, p. 102. 

" Reed 's The Battle of Shiloh, p. 110. 



72 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 

The killed in the two days' battle are almost exactly 
equal ; the wounded are in excess by nearly four hundred, in 
the Union army ; and there was in the Union army an excess 
in prisoners, of 1,926. Eliminating the prisoners taken in 
the Hornets' Nest, it appears that more prisoners were 
taken in the open field by the Union army than by the Con- 
federates. The loss in officers in Grant's army on Sunday 
from the grade of colonel up was much heavier than in the 
Confederate army — forty-five in the former to thirty in 
the latter." 

THE LOST DIVISION 

So much has been written and said about the failure of 
General Wallace to get his division on the field and into 
the fight on the first day of the battle that the subject de- 
serves a separate paragraph and a map of the roads over 
which his division marched. By reference to the map (No. 
VIII) it will be seen that the division occupied three camps 
— one brigade at Crump's Landing; one at Stonylonesome, 
two to three miles west; and one at Adamsville, about five 
miles out from the Landing toward Purdy. There is no 
dispute about the fact that Grant on his way up the river 
on Sunday morning stopped at Crump's Landing to notify 
Wallace to be in readiness for marching orders, though 
Wallace makes no mention of the fact in his official report, 
leaving it to be inferred that he had no order from Grant in 
the morning. He says that from the "continuous cannon- 
ading" he "inferred a general battle"; that he was in "an- 
ticipation of an order"; and that he ordered his first and 
third brigades to "concentrate" on the second at Stony- 
lonesome.'* In his Autobiography General Wallace says 
that he was satisfied before six o'clock, from the firing "up 

" Reed's The Battle of Shiloh. p. 23. 

78 War of the Rebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, Part I, p. 170. 



THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 73 

the river", that the battle was on ; and he says that at about 
seven o'clock, his concentration of brigades began. The 
official records show that this order was not carried out, for 
the third brigade did not move from Adamsville until about 
two-thirty afternoon, when it fell in behind the first and 
second brigades on the march toward Snake Creek bridge, 
and did not join them at Stonylonesome. 

About a year after the Battle of Shiloh, General Wallace 
had occasion to refer to the movements of his division, on 
that Sunday in explaining to the Department Commander 
the reasons for the lateness of his arrival on the field ; and 
in his explanation he incidentally referred to Grant's call 
at Crump's Landing on Sunday morning, fixing the time at 
"about nine o'clock "J* General Grant and members of 
his staflf fixed the time at seven to seven-thirty o'clock. 

No special importance is to be attached to this difference 
in time, however, for it had no important bearing on subse- 
quent events — it is mentioned only because it may justify 
a doubt as to the recollection of General Wallace in fixing 
the time at which he received final marching orders ; namely, 
"11 :30 a. m." It was the belief of General Grant and mem- 
bers of his staff that the order must have been received 
from a half hour to an hour earlier; though General Wal- 
lace's statement is now generally accepted. The form of 
order sent to Wallace can never be definitely settled, as it 
is nowhere a matter of record, and the original was lost in 
the hands of General Wallace, or through the fault of his 
Adjutant General. 

During the year after the Battle of Shiloh, there was 
much criticism of General Wallace, to which he, of course, 
made defence. And so General Grant requested his As- 
sistant Adjutant General, Colonel Rawlins, Colonel Mc- 
Pherson, Halleck's chief engineer, and Captain Rowley of 

70 »"<ir of the Bebellion: Official Secords, Series I, Vol. X, Part I, p. 175. 



74 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 

his staff, each of whom had knowledge of General Wal- 
lace's movements on Sunday, to write out in detail their 
recollections, to be submitted to the Department Com- 
mander. Each wrote quite fully about one year after the 
battle, C'olonel Rawlins reproducing from memory the order 
dictated by him as he claims, to C*aptain Baxter, which order 
was carried by the latter to Wallace. Following is the 
order from memory : 

Major- General Wallace : 

You will move forward your division from Crump's Land- 
ing, leaving a sufficient force to protect the public property at that 
place, to Pittsburg Landing, on the road nearest to and parallel 
with the river, and form in line at right angles with the river, 
immediately in rear of the camp of Maj. Gen. C. P. Smith's divi- 
sion on our right, and there await further orders.*" 

Captain Baxter started by boat to deliver the order 
"not later than nine o'clock", according to Colonel Raw- 
lins, and reported back to Grant before "12 o'clock m." 

In his official report, dated April 12, 1862, General Wal- 
lace says : "At 11.30 o'clock the anticipated order arrived, 
directing me to come up and take position on the right of 
the army and form my line of battle at a right angle with 
the river. ' ' *^ Writing a year later to General Halleck, ex- 
plaining the reasons for his late arrival on the field, he 
said : "At exactly 11 :30 a. m., a quartermaster by the name 
of Baxter brought me an order in writing unsigned by any- 
body", the bearer of the order explaining that he received 
it verbally and put it in writing while on the boat. 

In his Aiitohiograpliy, General Wallace enlarges some- 
what on the subject of this order, and says that it was writ- 
ten on paper discolored with tobacco stains and bore the 
imprint of boot-heels ; and he says that Baxter told him that 

80 War of the EebeUion : Official Secords, Series I, Vol. X, Part I, p. 185. 

81 War of the EebeUion: Official Eeeords, Series I, Vol. X, Part I, p. 170. 



. THE BATTLE OP SHILOH 75 

the paper was picked up from the floor of the ladies' cabin, 
on the steamboat. The original order having been lost, 
Wallace gives the following from memory: 

Yon will leave a sufficient force at Crump's Landing to guard 
the public property there: with the rest of the division march and 
form junction ^\^th the right of the army. Form line of battle at 
right angles with the river, and be governed by circumstances.*- 

The Rawlins form of order was reproduced from memory 
within one year after the event; that of Wallace, many 
years after — possibly forty years. Aside from the pre- 
cise road mentioned and the precise position on the field 
designated in the Rawlins order, the two are strikingly 
similar — sufficiently so to suggest that the former, which 
had long been in print, may have been consulted to refresh 
the memory in preparing the latter. 

Referring again to the events of Sunday as related by 
(^olonel Rawlins, it appears that about an hour after Cap- 
tain Baxter started by boat with orders to General Wal- 
lace, Grant sent a cavalry officer, familiar with the road, 
with a verbal message to Wallace "to hurry forward with 
all possible dispatch." This officer reported back to Grant, 
between twelve and one o'clock, that Wallace declined to 
move without written orders. According to Rawlins, Cap- 
tain Baxter reported back about 12 o'clock; that he deliv- 
ered the orders to Wallace at about ten o'clock; that Wal- 
lace read tlie memorandum handed him by Captain Baxter 
and "api)eared delighted ".**•' 

Immediately after the report of the cavalry officer that 
Wallace declined to move without written orders (Baxter's 
written order had not yet been delivered). Captain Rowley 
of Grant's staff was ordered to take the cavalry officer and 

»2WaII.iPo's Autohiography, Vol. I, p. 463. 

83 War of the BebeUion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X. Part II, pp. 185- 
180. 



76 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 

two orderlies and carry instructions to Wallace, with au- 
thority to put the instructions in writing and sign them, 
if necessary.** 

Captain Rowley's account of this incident is more in de- 
tail than that of Colonel Rawlins. Rowley corroborates 
Rawlins as to the report of the cavalry officer and says that 
Grant, after hearing the report, turned to him (Rowley) 
and said: "Captain, you will proceed to Crump's Landing 
and say to General Wallace that it is my orders that he 
bring his division up at once, coming up by the River road, 
crossing Snake Creek on the bridge". Captain Rowley says 
he was authorized to put the orders in writing and properly 
sign the same, should General Wallace require it. He was 
instructed to take the cavalry officer and two orderlies with 
him with the further instruction: "see that you do not 
spare horse flesh." ^'^ Captain Rowley gives the time of 
his starting on this mission at about twelve-thirty o'clock. 
Colonel Rawlins fixes it at "not later than 1 o'clock p. m." 

Captain Rowley's party rode directly to Wallace's head- 
quarters at Crump's Landing, to find "no signs of a camp 
except one baggage wagon that was just leaving." **' (The 
brigade had marched west to Stonylonesome in the morn- 
ing.) Getting directions from the driver of the wagon, the 
party followed the road taken by Wallace and overtook the 
rear of the division some five or six miles out. The divi- 
sion was "at a rest, sitting on each side of the road". Rid- 
ing forward to the head of the column, Wallace was found 
"sitting upon his horse, surrounded by his staff". Although 
it is not so stated, it is fair to assume that the division was 
at rest while the cavalry was scouting to the front, as Wal- 

84 War of the SebelHon: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, Part II, pp. 185- 
186. 

6s War of the Kebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, Part II, p. 179. 
88 War of the Rebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, Part II, p. 179. 



THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 77 

lace believed that he was approaching the crossing of Owl 
Creek, near the right of the army as it was in the morning, 
and where he might expect trouble. 

Captain Eowley delivered his orders and stated that it 
had been reported to Grant that he (Wallace) had de- 
clined to march without written orders, which according to 
Eowley, Wallace denounced as a "damned lie!" Wallace 
claimed that he had taken the ^^only road he knew anything 
about," *^ leading in the direction of the right of the army. 
On learning the real situation, Wallace ordered his division 
to counter-march for the purpose of reaching the river road 
by a short-cut if possible. Captain Eowley remained with 
the division, acting as guide. 

When Captain Eowley left the field with orders to Wal- 
lace, it was supposed that the head of the column would 
be found only a short distance north of Snake Creek bridge, 
and that Wallace would soon be in the precise position 
where he was expected to be, and where his presence was 
most needed. Two o'clock came, but no information from 
Wallace. Grant then sent two of the principal members 
of his staff, Colonel Eawlins, Assistant Adjutant General, 
and Colonel McPherson, Chief Engineer, to find the lost 
division. 

These officers rode directly to Crump's Landing, not 
knowing whether the division had left its camp. Following 
directions given them there, they came upon the division 
counter-marching on a cross-road to the river road, at about 
three-thirty afternoon. Colonel Eawlins repeated to Wal- 
lace the reported refusal to march without written orders, 
and Wallace repeated the denial. In regard to the road 
taken, Wallace said, according to Eawlins, that his guide 
had misled him. 

Soon after Eawlins and McPherson came up with the 

«T War of the Bebellion: Official Secords, Series I, Vol. X, Part I, p. 180. 



78 THE BATTLE OP SHILOH 

head of the column it was halted, as Rawlins states it, "for 
a considerable length of time, to enable it to close up and 
rest". There was another delay when near Snake Creek 
bridge "for full half an hour" while changing the position 
of the artillery in the column.** 

The three officers, Eawlins, McPherson, and Rowley,, 
agree in stating that the march of the column was very 
slow, and that no urging of the terms of Grant's order or 
the seriousness of the situation seemed to have auy effect. 
According to Rawlins, the speed was less than "a mile and 
a half an hour" after he joined the column, though "the 
roads were in fine condition; he was marching light; his 
men were in buoyant spirits, .... and eager to get for- 
ward." *" 

"Whatever the form of the order from General Grant to 
General Wallace, and however it may have been interpreted^ 
Wallace's march began from Stonylonesome at twelve 
o'clock, noon, with two brigades, over the Shunpike road 
toward Owl Creek bridge, the third brigade falling in the 
rear where the road intersects from Adamsville. Captain 
Rowley came up to the head of the column ' ' at rest, ' ' north 
of and overlooking Clear Creek valley, not Owl Creek as 
Wallace supposed — he was still more than three miles from 
Owl Creek, and the rear of the column was still at Adams- 
ville. The counter-march began from the north side of 
Clear Creek, at a point marked "Smith's" (Map VIII). 
It was necessary for the head of the column to march back 
about two and a half miles to find a cross-road, then about 
the same distance on the cross-road, before the rear could 
move; so it was well along in the afternoon when the last 
files of the third brigade left Adamsville. Colonel Rawlins 
and Colonel McPherson came up with Wallace on the cross- 

88 War of the Bebellion: Official Secords, Series I, Vol. X, Part II, p. 187. 
so War of the HebelUon: Official jRccords, Series I, Vol. X, Part II, p. 188. 



THE BATTLE OP SHILOH 79 

road at about three-thirty afternoon, as heretofore stated. 

From a glance at the map (VIII) showing the roads north 
of Snake Creek and the relation of the roads to the battle 
field, it appears that the shortest possible route from Wal- 
lace's camps to the right of the army (as it was even on 
Sunday morning) was by the river road and Snake Creek 
bridge (Wallace bridge on map). Not only was the road 
by Owl Creek bridge much longer, but the crossing was 
more hazardous in case the enemy succeeded in securing 
the crossing and planting a battery, for the approach from 
the North was through a swampy valley, heavily timbered 
and with dense undergrowth, along a narrow road where 
deployment was impossible and where the column would be 
exposed to direct artillery fire for a distance of nearly a 
mile. 

Had General Wallace been familiar with the roads cov- 
ering the territory which it was his special province to 
guard, no guide could have misled him, and he would not 
have said that he was on "the only road he knew anything 
about". His position at Crump's Landing was as much 
exposed to attack as was the camp at Pittsburg Landing, 
and he was as likely to need support as he was to be called 
on for support. It was of the utmost importance for the 
safety of his own command that he know the shortest and 
best road between the two camps. 

Forty years after the event General Wallace was forced 
to confess that he had all that time been laboring imder a 
mistake as to the position of the head of his column when 
the order was given to counter-march. He had all this 
time supposed that he was overlooking Owl Creek at the 
right of Sherman's lines when Captain Rowley came up 
and foimd his division "at rest", while his cavalry was 
scouting to the front. Instead of overlooking Owl Creek, 
he was overlooking the valley of Clear Creek three or four 



80 THE BATTLE OP SHILOH 

miles to the north. Of these facts General Wallace was 
convinced, not long before his death, by a personal inspec- 
tion of the territory and the roads over which his division 
marched, in company with the Secretary and Historian of 
the Shiloh National Military Park Commission, several of 
his own officers, with citizens living in the locality, and with 
a Confederate cavalry officer who was watching his move- 
ments on that Sunday. 

Strangely, General Wallace allowed this confessed error 
to stand in his Autobiography, with only partial correction. 

It seems not to be generally known, though it has been 
matter of official record since 1863, that General Wallace 
in view of General Grant's criticism of his (Wallace's) con- 
duct at Shiloh, asked of the Secretary of War a court of 
inquiry. The date of the request was July 18th, 1863; but 
on September 16th following, the Secretary of War was 
asked to "suspend action in the matter". General Wallace 
stating that he might be able to "satisfy General Grant 
upon the points involved".*"* It was on the advice of Gen- 
eral Sherman that the request for a court of inquiry was 
withdrawn, and the request was never renewed, though 
General Grant had found no reason to modify his original 
criticism, down to the time of writing the chapter on Shiloh, 
for his Memoirs.*' After the writing of that chapter, how- 
ever, a letter came into General Grant's hands, written by 
General Lew. Wallace to General W. H. L. Wallace, dated 
April 5, 1862 (correct date April 4th). In this letter Gen- 
eral Grant finds reasons for "materially" modifying the 
criticisms upon General Wallace, as they appear in the 
chapter itself, appending a foot-note thereto by way of ex- 
planation."- 

«o War of the Kebellion: Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, Part I, pp. 188-190. 
»i Personal Memoirs of V. S. Grant, Vol. I, pp. 337-338. 
92 Personal Memoirs of V. S. Grant, Vol. I, p. 351. 



THE BATTLE OP SHILOH 81 

The writer hereof is impressed with the idea that it was 
the promptings of General Grant's generous nature, rather 
than the contents of the letter that prompted the foot-note. 
It is not entirely clear, in view of the admissions made by 
General Wallace in his Autobiography, that the letter from 
General Lew. Wallace to General W. H. L. Wallace does 
not furnish additional ground for censure. At the moment 
of writing the letter the author of it must have been "sim- 
mering" in his mind the knowledge that the Confederate 
army was then on the march to attack Grant ; and yet there 
was no mention in the letter of that important fact. The 
reader must draw his own conclusions. 

J. W. Rich 
The State Historical Society op Iowa 
Iowa City 



LB D '12 



